United States District Court for the District of Columbia
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________
No. ???
4808 Moorland Lane
Bethesda, MD 20814,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, DC 20535,
and
GEORGE J. TENET,
individually and in his
capacity as Director of
Central Intelligence,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
LOUIS FREEH,
in his capacity as
Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC 20535,
and
ROBERT McNAMARA, JR.,
individually and in his
capacity as General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
"JOHN DOE",
individually and in his
capacity as the Chief,
Counterintelligence Center,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
EDWARD CURRAN,
individually and in his
capacity as Chief,
Counterespionage Group,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
JOHN LEWIS,
individually and in his
capacity as Assistant
Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC 20535,
and
RICHARD CALDER,
individually and in his
capacity as Deputy Director
for Administration,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
DAWN EILENBERGER,
individually and in her
capacity as the Principal
Deputy General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC 20505,
and
KATHLEEN McGINN,
individually and in her
capacity as Complaints
Attorney, Office of Equal
Employment Opportunity,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC 20505,
Defendants.
_______________
C O M P L A I N T INTRODUCTION JURISDICTION VENUE PARTIES SUMMARY OF CASE STATEMENT OF FACTS VERIFICATION
(Employment Discrimination; Constitutional Violations;
Constitutional Torts; Privacy Act Violations)
_______________
1. This civil action concerns outrageous, constitutionally repugnant, and ultra vires counterintelligence ("CI") and security investigations and disciplinary processes conducted against the plaintiff Adam J. Ciralsky by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA" or the "Agency") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI" or the "Bureau"). Mr. Ciralsky was unjustly singled out for investigation and subsequently interrogated, harassed, surveilled and terminated from employment with the CIA solely because he is a Jew and he practices the Jewish religion. Moreover, this ultra vires and constitutionally repugnant conduct was knowingly undertaken by defendants in conformance with a custom, policy and practice of both the CIA and FBI. Here, Mr. Ciralsky seeks damages to compensate for him for his injuries, and injunctive relief to prevent further harm to himself and other Jewish-Americans who work or seek to work in the federal government in so-called intelligence agencies. Indeed, damages and injunctive and other equitable relief are being sought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Act of 1972 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 et seq. and § 1981a, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. §552, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as directly under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and with regard to those defendants sued in their individual capacities, pursuant to constitutional tort claim theory annunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 403 U.S. 388 1999 (1971).
2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims made in this civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (general federal question jurisdiction with regard to the direct constitutional claims and the Bivens claims), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (with regard to the Title VII claims), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B) (with regard to the FOIA claims), 552a(g)(1) (with regard to the Privacy Act claims), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (with regard to the conspiracy claims), and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1810 and 1828 (with regard to the FISA claims).
3. Venue is appropriate in the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B), 552a(g)(5), and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), as a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred here and but for the unlawful actions complained of herein -- including those actions that were taken in violation of Title VII, plaintiff would have been employed in this district.
4. Plaintiff Adam J. Ciralsky ("Ciralsky" or "plaintiff") is a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of the State of Maryland. He was employed by the CIA from December 2, 1996 until December 13, 1999 as an Attorney Advisor in the Legal Honors Program in the Agency's Office of General Counsel ("OGC"). Absent the unlawful actions complained of herein, including the violations of Title VII, he would have been assigned to the National Security Council, Executive Office of the President, a job that is located in the District of Columbia.
5. Defendant CIA is an agency within the executive branch of the government of the United States, maintaining offices within the District of Columbia and having more than 500 employees in all weeks from 1996 through the present.
6. Defendant FBI is an agency within the executive branch of the government of the United States, maintaining offices within the District of Columbia and having more than 500 employees in all weeks from 1996 through the present.
7. Defendant George Tenet ("Tenet") is the Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI") and, as such, the head of the CIA. Tenet's official duties are performed at various locations, both domestic and abroad, but primarily in the District of Columbia and in the Commonwealth of Virginia. He is here sued in both his official capacity as DCI and his individual capacity.
8. Defendant Louis Freeh ("Freeh") is the Director of the FBI. Freeh's official duties are performed at various locations, both domestic and abroad, but primarily in the District of Columbia. He is here sued in his official capacity only.
9. Defendant Richard Calder ("Calder") was at all times relevant to this complaint serving as the Deputy Director for Administration ("DDA") of the CIA. He is here sued in both his official capacity as DDA and his individual capacity.
10. Defendant John Lewis ("Lewis") was at all times relevant to this complaint serving as the Assistant Director of the FBI with responsibility for CI. He is here sued in both his official capacity as Assistant Director of the FBI and his individual capacity.
11. Robert McNamara, Jr. ("McNamara") entered on duty as General Counsel of the CIA in December 1997 or January 1998. As the agency's General Counsel, he is the CIA's highest ranking legal and ethics official and was Ciralsky's senior supervisor. He is here sued in both his official capacity as General Counsel and his individual capacity.
12. Dawn Eilenberger ("Eilenberger") was at all times relevant to this complaint serving as the Principal Deputy General Counsel of the CIA. From August 1997 until December 1997 or January 1998 (at which time defendant McNamara entered on duty as the Agency's General Counsel), Eilenberger was Acting General Counsel of the CIA, and as such, the highest ranking legal and ethics officer at the CIA at the time, and she was Ciralsky's senior supervisor. She is here sued in both her official capacity as Principal Deputy General Counsel and her individual capacity.
13. Defendant "John Doe" ("Doe") was at all times relevant to this complaint serving as the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center ("CIC") at the CIA. [Doe's identity is classified and has been masked in this complaint at the request of the CIA.] He is here sued in both his official capacity as C/CIC and his individual capacity.
14. Defendant Edward Curran ("Curran") was at all times relevant to this complaint serving as Chief of the Counterespionage Group ("CIC/CEG") within the CIA's CIC. Although assigned to the CIA, Curran was an employee of the FBI. He is currently serving as Chief of CI at the Department of Energy. He is here sued in both his official capacity as C/CIC/CEG and his individual capacity.
15. Kathleen McGinn ("McGinn") was at all times relevant to this complaint serving as Complaints Attorney for the CIA's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity ("OEEO"). She is here sued in both her official capacity as the CIA's OEEO Complaints Attorney and her individual capacity.
17. Between 1991 and 1996, during college and law school, Ciralsky worked in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, initially as an intern and later as a contractor/consultant. He received security clearances at the "secret" and "top secret/special compartmented information" ("SCI") levels following security clearance investigations by the Department of Defense.
18. The CIA employed Ciralsky in its Legal Honors Program beginning in December 1996 as an Attorney Advisor in the Agency’s Office of General Counsel ("OGC"). Ciralsky served the CIA with distinction and received an Exceptional Performance Award and letters of commendation.
19. Nevertheless, on October 20, 1997, the CIA suspended Ciralsky and withheld his scheduled promotion. On July 2, 1998, the Agency revoked Ciralsky’s security clearance. On February 25, 1999, the Agency stripped Ciralsky of his pay, and on December 13, 1999, the Agency terminated Ciralsky. All these actions were taken by the CIA against Ciralsky because he is identified as an observant Jew whose family has supported Jewish causes.
20. In response to questioning about Ciralsky’s treatment, a high-ranking CIA official whose identity was masked recently disclosed that the Agency uses a per se anti-Semitic profile specifically to target American Jews at the CIA for disparate and unlawful security and CI investigations and treatment. American Jews, Ciralsky among them, have had their security clearances revoked and have been fired by the CIA purely on account of the Agency's suspicion that Jews pose a special security risk because of a perceived divided loyalty to both the United States of America and the State of Israel.
21. According to the aforementioned CIA official, "the so-called evidence that has been presented regarding a number of individuals who, it's claimed, are spying for Israel . . . is very, very flimsy indeed" and CIA officials are "casting too wide a net . . . using tactics that are just not called for, and . . . are harming folks who are not a problem."
22. Ciralsky’s CI and security files reveal that the CIA and the FBI began with the assumption that Ciralsky and other committed American Jews are disloyal Americans and should be treated as security risks. A selective release of documents by the CIA on July 7, 1998 reveals the following:
a. official CIA records describe Ciralsky as a "rich Jewish" employee with a "wealthy daddy";
b. official CIA records compare Ciralsky to other "hard-line" Jews at the CIA who "think in terms of 'us' versus 'them'";
c. official CIA records refer to the simple exercise of First Amendment rights by Ciralsky and other Jewish-Americans as "pro-Israeli baggage" and a "CI issue" deserving of special treatment;
d. official CIA records evidence that the CIA and FBI monitor the activities of, and conversations among, Jewish employees at the CIA because of their religion;
e. official CIA records detail and cast aspersions upon Ciralsky's and his family's monetary support for the United Jewish Appeal and Israel Bonds -- activity which, according to the CIA, "paints [Ciralsky] and his family as extreme supporters of Israel's hard liners in the Likud party;"
f. official CIA records evidence that the CIA determined that Ciralsky would be forced out of the Agency on account of his religious beliefs and associations some four months before he purportedly manifested the "lack of candor" which was (later) claimed as the justification for the termination of his employment, when ultimately, the "lack of candor" was nothing more than an unproved accusation that Ciralsky was "withholding" information from the CIA about the aforementioned First Amendment activity because, again according to the CIA, "he wishes to avoid being seen such a lover of Israel [sic];"
g. official CIA records equate Ciralsky's family's lawful support for Jewish charitable causes in the United States with clandestine support for politicians and political parties in Israel;
h. official CIA records indicate that defendant Tenet personally orchestrated Ciralsky's firing and conspired with his subordinates to base Ciralsky's dismissal on the outcome of a polygraph examination that Ciralsky had yet to take (and, in the event, probably passed); and
i. official CIA records reveal that defendant Tenet and his subordinates predetermined the outcome of the Employee Review Panels which were supposed to serve as Ciralsky's procedural due process.
23. Based on the assumption that American Jews who are observant of the Jewish faith are security risks for the United States, the CIA and FBI targeted Ciralsky for revocation of his security clearance. The CIA thereafter deceived plaintiff about the matter, and abused the security clearance process, in violation of the United States Constitution, various U.S. statutes, and its own regulations, to attempt to secure evidence that Ciralsky was unfit for a security clearance because of his religious activities.
24. In the course of what the CIA euphemistically calls "security and CI processing", Ciralsky was:
a. interrogated and harassed for months about his -- and his family’s -- Jewish beliefs and completely lawful and protected ethnic and religious associations and activities;
b. repeatedly subjected, under false pretenses and without the requisite Miranda warnings, to hostile custodial interrogations in which CIA officials, according to their own written accounts, "got into his face just a little bit" and ensured that Ciralsky's "chair was backed against the wall in no time at all!" [emphasis original];
c. subjected to polygraph examinations which Agency security officials -- at defendant Tenet's direction -- intentionally rigged; and
d. subjected to unlawful electronic surveillance.
25. In a series of electronic mail ("e-mail") messages, memoranda to and conversations with his supervisors, Ciralsky described and protested the disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination to which he was being subjected. In response to these communications, the defendants retaliated against Ciralsky by, among other things:
a. placing him on indefinite administrative leave after he reported defendants' conduct to the CIA's Inspector General (IG) and its Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (OEEO);
b. refusing to investigate -- as required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 et seq., and the regulations of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEOC") authorized by that statute, 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 -- Ciralsky’s charges of unlawful employment discrimination, notwithstanding the fact that Ciralsky pleaded on multiple occasions with the CIA's OEEO and IG to do so;
c. branding him a security risk and revoking his security clearance on account of an alleged "initial failure to disclose and a lack of candor concerning" Israelis and American-Israeli dual citizens, although such associations were lawful, unexceptional and according to CIA officials exempt from disclosure under the Agency's own regulations for reporting foreign contacts;
d. preventing his scheduled rotation to a position on the National Security Council ("NSC");
e. convening in secret Employee Review Panels ("ERPs") – which were supposed to serve as Ciralsky's procedural due process -- ostensibly to consider his loyalty to the United States and fitness for employment at the CIA (and anywhere else in the U.S. Government) and denying Ciralsky and his attorneys the opportunity to:
i. appear (or even to know when or where the ERP was meeting);
ii. know the substance of the actual charges against him;
iii. confront the evidence arrayed against him, if any (and to know which evidence, if any, the ERP considered);
iv. cross-examine witnesses and present countervailing evidence in his favor; and
v. have an impartial trier of fact (whose identity is known) sit in judgement.
f. acknowledging in writing following the first ERP that CIA officials had deliberately misled Ciralsky and counsel about the nature and genesis of the so-called "charges" against him;
g. relying on inaccurate, unlawful and nakedly anti-Semitic material in assessing Ciralsky's fitness for government service and a security clearance;
h. finally revoking Ciralsky's security clearance after he and his counsel reported the Defendants' unlawful conduct to the Attorney General of the United States;
i. providing Ciralsky an "appeals process" which, according to CIA Associate General Counsel James Archebald, is "a foregone conclusion" and therefore denies Ciralsky due process of law by affording him no meaningful opportunity to be heard;
j. unilaterally and indefinitely extending Ciralsky's employment contract with the CIA while at the same time involuntarily placing him on leave without pay ("LWOP");
k. threatening Ciralsky that the CIA would seek to have his bar license lifted (on grounds which remain a mystery) if he filed the instant action;
l. making veiled threats to Ciralsky's personal safety; and
m. subjecting Ciralsky to discrimination in employment practices and otherwise unlawful treatment in violation of federal law.
I. THE CIA HIRES CIRALSKY AND GRANTS HIM A SECURITY CLEARANCE AFTER HE FAVORABLY COMPLETES AN EXHAUSTIVE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION AND POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
26. The CIA offered employment to Ciralsky in May of 1996 before Ciralsky's law school graduation, as part of the CIA's Legal Honors Program. Thereafter, Ciralsky underwent and successfully completed an in-depth investigation by the CIA's Office of Personnel Security ("OPS"), which included a six-month long background investigation, a battery of medical and psychological testing, and an exhaustive polygraph examination.
27. Despite clearing Ciralsky, the CIA official responsible for approving his security clearance noted in writing as follows:
I am somewhat concerned with his strong ties, study and travel to Israel . . . Subject however has favorably cleared all questions on the polygraph and has had security clearance in the past. In light of that, I am recommending security approval . . .
28. On November 6, 1996, a second CIA official concurred with the recommendation that Ciralsky's security clearance be approved. However, that official insisted that Ciralsky receive a briefing "sensitizing" him to the Agency's alleged concerns about his religious and ethnic "ties." An internal CIA Memorandum for the Record ("MFR") from the OPS indicates that it consulted with the CIA's OGC and that OGC concurred in the plan to "sensitize" Ciralsky.
29. After successfully completing the CIA's security clearance processing, Ciralsky entered on duty at the CIA on December 2, 1996.
30. At the time Ciralsky entered on duty, he entered into an employment agreement with the CIA. Pursuant to the agreement, the CIA was to pay Ciralsky as a GS-11, step 1 equivalent -- that is, $37,094 per annum. The employment agreement's term commenced December 2, 1996, and continued for a two-year period, but could be "extended upon notice by the Government."
31. On December 4, 1996, during the Agency's orientation course for new employees, the CIA's special Applicant and Operations Branch ("A&OB") summoned Ciralsky to a special briefing tailored specifically for him on the basis of his Jewish religious beliefs and Jewish ethnic ties. During special briefing, the A&OB official warned Ciralsky that he was a prime candidate for "targeting" by the Israeli intelligence services based upon his religious and ethnic "background," his previous travels to Israel and his affiliation with lawful and well-known Jewish organizations and activities. At no time did the A&OB representative indicate, however, that the CIA had any specific CI or security concern about any of the Israelis or American-Israelis with whom Ciralsky may have had contact in the past, or any of Ciralsky's activities, all of which he had fully disclosed to the CIA -- in accordance with Agency regulations.
32. Under Headquarters Regulation ("HR") 10-15, if there had been concern about a real or potential CI or security risk, the CIA would have been required to alert Ciralsky to the risk and allow him to either terminate the contact immediately or leave the Agency's employ.
33. Although Ciralsky has reported to the CIA his minimal contacts with at least thirty individuals since July 1996 to date, the Agency has never warned Ciralsky to avoid contact with any of these individuals, or any Israeli or American-Israeli dual national.
II. ELEMENTS WITHIN THE CIA AND FBI, UNBEKNOWNST TO CIRALSKY, HAD PREVIOUSLY COMMENCED AN UNLAWFUL SECURITY INVESTIGATION INTO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ASSOCIATIONS
34. Notwithstanding Ciralsky's favorable background investigations and polygraph results, on December 10, 1996, only eight days after his entered on duty, the CIA and FBI began an unlawful and discriminatory "re-investigation" of his religious beliefs, practices, associations and activities. Thus, unbeknownst to Ciralsky, before he had even set foot in his CIA office, much less had access to classified information, CIA and FBI officials targeted him because he is Jewish and had engaged in wholly lawful activity, indeed, activity protected under the First Amendment.
35. This re-investigation, conducted by defendants Tenet, Freeh, Doe, Curran, Lewis, Calder and Eilenberger (and, eventually, McNamara), focused from the outset solely on Ciralsky's religion and ethnicity, that is, his being a practicing Jew. On January 15, 1997, a CI official (whose identity was redacted by the CIA) compiled a "master list" of all of Ciralsky's Jewish activities, associations and studies in chronological order since age fifteen. This "list" makes no mention of Ciralsky's secular activities, affiliations and studies, which were equally related to Ciralsky's character.
36. While Ciralsky's Judaic Studies college minor made the above-referenced "list", his International Affairs college major did not. Similarly, while Ciralsky's Hebrew language training made this "list", his Spanish language training did not. Likewise, though Ciralsky's role as vice president of the Jewish Law Students at the University of Illinois made the "list", his participation in other campus student groups, such as the College Republicans and various academic honor societies, did not. Moreover, while Ciralsky's travel to Israel made the "list", his travel to China, Egypt, and several European countries did not.
37. Although Ciralsky first became a target in December 1996, it was not until August 1997 that Agency officials informed Ciralsky about the "re-investigation." Even then, as described infra, CIA officials deliberately deceived Ciralsky as to the investigation's genesis, nature and scope.
III. THE CIA DECEIVES CIRALSKY ABOUT ITS "RE-INVESTIGATION"
38. In the summer of 1997, as part of the OGC's Honors Program, Ciralsky sought a rotational assignment to the White House National Security Council (NSC). On the afternoon of August 7, 1997, defendant Eilenberger summoned Ciralsky to her office and explained that he would need to undergo what she described as a "routine security re-investigation" in advance of his being rotated to the NSC.
39. Despite defendant Eilenberger's representation, the Agency was not conducting a routine re-investigation, and had no intention of allowing Ciralsky to rotate to the NSC. Indeed, four months earlier, in April of 1997, as a result of their secret re-investigation of him, defendants Tenet, Freeh, Doe, Curran, Lewis, Calder and Eilenberger had concocted a plan for the termination of Ciralsky's employment with the CIA based on the fact that he is an observant Jew and "fit" a profile maintained by the Agency and Bureau for targeting observant Jews for employment discrimination.
IV. DEFENDANTS USE SUBTERFUGE IN THEIR PLAN TO TERMINATE CIRALSKY BECAUSE OF HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ASSOCIATIONS
40. As early as April 18, 1997, defendants Tenet, Freeh, Doe, Curran, Lewis, Calder and Eilenberger decided to terminate Ciralsky because of his religious and ethnic background. Thereafter, these defendants discussed means of covering up their intentions so as to hide them from Ciralsky's scrutiny and the scrutiny of others. Among other things, these officials:
a. Debated whether to re-adjudicate Ciralsky's security clearance based upon his alleged "strong ties" to Jewish causes, or simply contrive his dismissal on other grounds;
b. Tried to manipulate Ciralsky's 1993 and 1996 polygraph results and transform otherwise "non-deceptive" responses into "deceptive" ones; and
c. Re-re-investigate Ciralsky in an effort to generate derogatory information which, in turn, could be used ostensibly to legitimize his dismissal on national security grounds, but actually would force Ciralsky's dismissal because of his religious and ethnic heritage.
V. DEFENDANTS USE THE POLYGRAPH AS AN INSTRUMENT TO BULLY AND DECEIVE CIRALSKY DURING THEIR INVESTIGATION OF HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ASSOCIATIONS
41. In August of 1997, a CIA Security Officer, acting at the behest of defendant Eilenberger, advised Ciralsky that, as part of the security clearance investigation, he would have to undergo an additional polygraph examination. As a justification for this, the security officer represented to Ciralsky that all Honors Attorneys who convert to Staff positions are re-investigated and re-polygraphed. The security officer also represented that Ciralsky's polygraph would consist of a "lifestyle" and a "CI" component, both of which would be limited in scope to the period from his last polygraph (July 1996) to the then-present (August 1997).
42. Despite the foregoing representations of a CIA Security officer, Ciralsky was the only CIA Honors Attorney ever to be re-investigated and/or re-polygraphed prior to starting a second-year Honors Program assignment. Moreover, CIA Honors Attorneys who have converted to Staff positions with the Agency at the end of their two-year contract routinely have not been re-polygraphed in conjunction with their conversions.
43. Ciralsky soon learned that the August 19, 1997 polygraph would not be limited in scope to the period since his last test (July 1996), as had been represented to him by the CIA security officer. Rather, it would be far reaching both as to time and subject matter.
44. The far reaching scope of Ciralsky’s August 1997 polygraph violated HR 10-4: Re-investigation Program, which dictates that "[a] re-investigation normally will cover the period subsequent to the completion of the most recent security investigation." It became clear to Ciralsky that, contrary to the repeated representations of Agency officials at the time, his "re-investigation" was neither normal nor routine. Indeed, the CIA and FBI deliberately deceived Ciralsky about the basis for and scope of his special security processing as a whole, and his polygraph re-examinations in particular.
45. Agency officials, at defendant Tenet’s direction and/or acquiescence, employed the polygraph -- a purportedly objective scientific test -- as the vehicle by which they could most easily orchestrate Ciralsky's dismissal from the CIA. In this regard, the CIA's polygraph program as applied to Ciralsky was neither objective nor scientific. Indeed, the defendants used the polygraph as an instrument of abuse in order to violate Ciralsky's rights under the Constitution’s First and Fifth Amendments, as well as his rights under Title VII. In fact, the polygraphs to which Ciralsky was subjected by the CIA were, by design, a sham. Indeed, Agency officials had decided well in advance of the August 1997 polygraph that Ciralsky would not "pass", and the Agency's polygrapher had been instructed accordingly.
46. On August 19, 1997, a CIA official polygraphed Ciralsky three times in rapid succession. The official then attempted to intimidate Ciralsky by accusing him of being "deceptive" in response to every question put to him. Ciralsky was labeled a spy, a "sleeper agent", a computer hacker and a terrorist. He was also accused of withholding information about his finances.
47. Although Ciralsky was already extremely uncomfortable about having been deceived with regard to the nature and scope of this polygraph examination, he tried to take the CIA's accusations in stride. After continued browbeating, Ciralsky then thought it prudent to raise with the polygraph operator his serious and well-founded concerns that he was being subjected to an increasingly hostile and discriminatory security "investigation."
48. The CIA's polygraph operator rebuffed Ciralsky, dismissing his concerns of disparate and improper treatment. The polygrapher then further intimidated Ciralsky by warning that his attempt to determine how similarly-situated individuals were treated was a "sure sign of deception" on his part. Defendants thus considered Ciralsky's concerns about anti-Semitic and unlawful security and CI practices to constitute an independent basis to suspect Ciralsky and judge him by a set of standards not applied to non-Jews.
49. Despite the legitimate and reasonable concerns Ciralsky raised, the CIA polygrapher insisted that Ciralsky be polygraphed yet again. When Ciralsky requested -- as was his right under CIA regulations and policy -- that he be allowed instead to consult with management and return another day, the polygrapher refused and demanded that Ciralsky submit immediately to another polygraph examination even if the surrounding circumstances amounted to duress.
50. To further intimidate Ciralsky, the CIA polygrapher threatened to immediately revoke Ciralsky's security clearance, which would have effectively terminated Ciralsky's employment with CIA, if he did not submit to further testing that day and under existing circumstances.
51. As was his right under CIA regulations, Ciralsky then asked to speak with a polygraph supervisor. The polygrapher denied the request, and, with no alternative, Ciralsky relented and underwent another round of polygraphing.
52. Ciralsky's polygraph examination lasted seven-and-a-half hours on August 19, 1997. The polygrapher then instructed Ciralsky to return for follow-up polygraphing on August 21, 1997 and to bring with him documents detailing any relationship or contact with American-Israeli dual nationals and/or Israelis, although CIA regulations require the disclosure of only "close and continuing" contacts with foreign nationals, dual nationals being specifically exempt from disclosure altogether.
53. As demanded by the Agency's polygrapher, Ciralsky returned to for further polygraph examination on August 21, 1997 and, as instructed, brought with him documents detailing his lawful, indeed, perfectly unexceptional, and constitutionally-protected contacts with American-Israeli dual nationals and/or Israelis. Ciralsky described to the polygrapher why he believed he was being subjected to disparate and improper treatment: that after consenting to what was described as a "routine" security investigation, he was immediately accused of lying about his ethnic and religious associations, associations which not only preceded Ciralsky's employment with the CIA, but which had been thoroughly examined in two previous CI polygraph tests and overlapping background investigations. [Ciralsky has since passed a third CI polygraph, conducted November 5, 1998.] The polygrapher accepted the documents from Ciralsky and then advised him that the polygraph would not proceed at that time.
VI. DEFENDANTS' COUNTERESPIONAGE GROUP CONTINUES THE SHAM INVESTIGATION OF CIRALSKY, PROVIDING HIM WITH A BUGGED LAPTOP COMPUTER
54. On or about September 10, 1997, defendant Eilenberger informed Ciralsky that, based on the results his August 19, 1997 polygraph, the Agency had referred his case to the CIC/CEG for resolution. CIC/CEG is a joint CIA-FBI entity within the CIC and is located at CIA headquarters. At the time, defendant Curran was the Chief of CIC/CEG and he, in turn, reported to defendants Tenet, Freeh, Doe and Lewis.
55. Upon information and belief, CIA had never initiated a CIC/CEG investigation against an employee based on the results of a single polygraph; results which were and are directly contradicted by two other polygraphs. Moreover, upon information and belief, some of the CIA's most senior officials, including Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station, have repeatedly "failed" their own polygraphs, some as often as six times, without repercussions. These officials have remained in their posts and have not been subjected to CIC/CEG investigations.
56. On September 11, 1997, Ciralsky met with CIC/CEG personnel. At that time, Ciralsky outlined the series of events which led him to believe and state to others that the Defendants had unfairly targeted and subjected him to disparate and improper treatment on the basis of his and his family's protected religious and ethnic associations. The CIC/CEG personnel dismissed and ridiculed Ciralsky's claims of disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination, and accused Ciralsky of fabricating his concerns in order to deflect attention away from his own "deception."
57. The CIC/CEG personnel interrogated Ciralsky for approximately five-and-a-half hours, focusing exclusively on his travels as a student to Israel, his involvement with legitimate and well-known Jewish causes, his contacts with American-Israeli dual nationals and Israelis, and an assortment of other issues related to his and his family's constitutionally-protected associations.
58. At no point during this or any other CIC/CEG interrogation did the investigators refer to Ciralsky's associations or contacts with any country other than Israel or his association with any organization unrelated to Jewish causes or charities.
59. The CIC/CEG interrogators questioned Ciralsky regarding his parents' financial support for charitable American-Jewish causes such as the United Jewish Appeal ("UJA") and Israel Bonds, causes which are and were supported by hundreds of thousands of Jewish and non-Jewish United States citizens.
60. The CIC/CEG interrogators also focused on the fact that two of Ciralsky's high school trips to Israel took place under the auspices of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation, a charitable organization, which like its counterparts throughout the United States, supports social, charitable, and community services in this country and in Israel.
61. For his part, Ciralsky was so shocked by the focus and tenor of the questioning and the allegation that his legitimate involvement in Jewish and Zionist causes and activities was somehow inappropriate, that he offered the Agency unfettered access to his phone, bank and all other personal records, as well as help in setting up interviews with family and friends, and other discreet CI assistance.
62. After five-and-a-half hours of interrogation, the CIC/CEG interrogators instructed Ciralsky to document any and all information regarding his Israeli and American-Israeli "contacts" and to commit that information to writing, using only the specially designated laptop computer they provided to him, insisting that he use it both at work and at home.
63. Upon information and belief, defendants surreptitiously equipped the laptop computer supplied to Ciralsky with data and voice "trap" (i.e. electronic surveillance) capabilities.
64. Ciralsky met with CIC/CEG again on September 16, 1997 and, as previously instructed, brought with him detailed chronologies of his contacts with the few American-Israeli dual nationals and Israelis with whom he had ever had contact. None of these individuals met the CIA's threshold for the disclosure of "close and continuing" contacts. CIC/CEG personnel then commenced a new interrogation about Ciralsky's constitutionally-protected religious activities, threatening to revoke Ciralsky's security clearance unless he accounted for what was described as his "deception" regarding his and his family's associations with Jewish causes and the State of Israel. Whereupon, CIC/CEG personnel proceeded to question Ciralsky concerning his parents’ financial support for charitable Jewish causes including the UJA and Israel Bonds.
65. Official CIA documents reveal that CIA and FBI officials were keenly interested in the Ciralsky family's monetary support for well-known Jewish causes and charities because, according to these officials themselves, such support "paints [plaintiff] and his family as extreme supporters of Israel's hard liners." However, such support was and is: (a) lawful; (b) protected by the First Amendment and CIA regulations; (c) common among Jewish and non-Jewish Americans; and (d) not earmarked for any American or Israeli political party or military or intelligence entity.
66. The CIC/CEG personnel who interrogated Ciralsky viewed Ciralsky as attempting to engage in an "intellectual" debate and were interested only in intimidating him about his religious activities. As captured in a September 16, 1997 e-mail Memorandum to a CIC/CEG colleague, for example, one of plaintiff's CIC/CEG interrogators boasted:
Hey [name redacted], I figured I'd give you a running account on [Adam] so you wouldn't feel like you missed a thing . . . [Adam and I] spent about 1-1/2 hours reviewing the stuff he brought . . .
Then he tried to get into a debate over the poly process . . . He had time to regroup and he was going to try to debate me. Ha! . . .
Of course, I got into his face just a little bit, and he realized he wasn't dealing with [DIANE]. Needless to say, his chair was backed against the wall in no time at all!
I told him that he could engage in all the intellectual debate he chose to, but he would not engage me in it . . . It was kinda fun, but it didn't last too long because he wasn't getting anywhere with his arguments. [Emphasis original]
67. On or about September 19, 1997, the CIC/CEG personnel interrogated Ciralsky yet again, this time questioning him at length concerning two American-Israeli dual nationals. Notwithstanding the fact that these dual nationals, who are full United States citizens, are specifically exempt from disclosure as "foreign contacts" under every CIA regulation ever promulgated on the matter, the CIC/CEG personnel browbeat Ciralsky for not reporting his American-Israeli "contacts." The CIC/CEG interrogators also questioned Ciralsky extensively about his college Hebrew language professor with whom Ciralsky has not communicated since 1993.
68. During the course of the interrogations, the CIC/CEG personnel repeatedly invoked defendant Tenet's name in threatening that the CIA and FBI would not favorably resolve its investigation until Ciralsky divulged any and every piece of information concerning his lawful and constitutionally-protected associations with American-Jewish causes and the State of Israel. The CIC/CEG interrogators instructed Ciralsky to provide this information in writing.
69. As instructed, on September 26, 1997, Ciralsky completed and submitted a Memorandum for the Record ("MFR") describing his lawful and constitutionally-protected associations with American-Jewish causes and the State of Israel. The MFR reiterated Ciralsky's concerns about the investigation to which he was being subjected. Ciralsky detailed in the MFR his and his family's constitutionally-protected ethnic and religious associations with American-Jewish causes and the State of Israel. Ciralsky described his pride in his beliefs and activities and stated that he was at a loss to explain why the CIA had come to view them as a threat.
VII. THE CIA'S LEGAL AND ETHICS OFFICIALS IGNORE CIRALSKY'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT A PATENTLY UNLAWFUL AND OFFENSIVE INVESTIGATION
70. Ciralsky copied the September 26, 1997 MFR to, among others, his superiors and, ultimately, to defendant Eilenberger, the CIA’s then highest-ranking legal and ethics official. Upon reading the MFR, defendant Eilenberger refused to acknowledge Ciralsky's concerns about CI profiling, disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination. Instead, she advised Ciralsky that his concerns were "not helpful." She also stated that CIC/CEG officials were "pleased with [Ciralsky's] cooperation," believed "everything was going well," and "felt they had every bit of information that's out there." Finally, defendant Eilenberger promised that when the Agency's investigation of Ciralsky concluded, she would investigate "to see if inappropriate lines had been crossed" regarding Ciralsky and "take action accordingly."
71. As the CIA's highest-ranking legal and ethics official at the time, defendant Eilenberger was required by federal law to immediately conduct an investigation into Ciralsky's charges of disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination and to take swift and appropriate remedial action.
72. Prior to her current position as Principal Deputy General Counsel, defendant Eilenberger headed the CIA's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity ("OEEO"). Thus, defendant Eilenberger knew or should have known how and when to respond to Ciralsky's allegations of disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination.
73. As of this filing, neither defendant Eilenberger nor any other CIA official has undertaken an investigation into Ciralsky's charges of disparate treatment and unlawful employment discrimination, although plaintiff reported them to the Agency's OGC, IG and OEEO, and the latter promised to open an investigation. Rather, CIA officials retaliated against Ciralsky for protesting and complaining about the disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination to which he was being subjected.
VIII. DEFENDANTS CONSPIRE TO TERMINATE CIRALSKY'S SECURITY CLEARANCE AND EMPLOYMENT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS STATUS AS A JEW AND HIS JEWISH RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ASSOCIATIONS, USING YET ANOTHER POLYGRAPH AS A SUBTERFUGE FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES
74. By September 19, 1997, defendants Tenet, Freeh, Doe, Curran, Lewis, Calder and Eilenberger had long since decided to terminate Ciralsky from his employment with the CIA because of his religion and ethnic background. An e-mail memorandum prepared that day by a subordinate of defendant Curran confirms that the CIA planned to terminate Ciralsky by rigging a polygraph examination:
I met with our buddy [i.e., Ciralsky] today for one hour. Very peaceful and nonconfrontational. He's still writing stuff on his laptop, but he didn't bring in any more today. I asked him a few questions, filled in a couple of gaps for the report, etc.
[Name redacted] just came in and said this case came up during the DCI briefing this morning. Tenet says this guy is outta here because of a lack of candor. Dawn [Eilenberger] was at the meeting too . . .
Subject [Ciralsky] is scheduled for a poly on Thursday, 2 Oct. Once that's over, it looks like we'll be waving goodbye to our friend.
75. The polygraph scheduled for October 2, 1997 was a further effort to intimidate and deceive Ciralsky. Although officials would later represent to plaintiff's counsel that the polygraph "was afforded to Mr. Ciralsky as an opportunity to verify the information he provided during the CIC interviews," in fact, the CIA intended the October 2, 1997 polygraph, like the August 19, 1997 polygraph before it, to be a charade designed to manufacture a basis for Ciralsky's termination.
76. As the above-quoted September 19, 1997 e-mail indicates, on or before that date defendant Tenet instructed his subordinates, including (but not limited to) defendants Doe, Curran, Calder and Eilenberger, to terminate Ciralsky on account of his supposed "lack of candor" regarding his lawful and protected religious and ethnic associations. This decision preceded by at least two weeks the scheduled polygraph on which his later termination was justified. Thus, Ciralsky's fate was predetermined.
77. Instead of providing Ciralsky an opportunity "to verify the information he provided," defendants Doe, Curran, Calder and Eilenberger seized upon the polygraph as a convenient vehicle by which they could justify their execution of defendant Tenet's instructions to dismiss Ciralsky for an alleged "lack of candor." Thus, while CIA officials would later cite Ciralsky's October 3, 1997 polygraph as "evidence" of his purported "lack of candor," the truth is, as the CIA's own documents reveal, that the "lack of candor" allegation preceded the conduct (i.e., the polygraph) which supposedly gave rise to it.
78. As October 2, 1997 coincided with Rosh Hashanah, one of the holiest days of the Jewish calendar, Ciralsky requested that the polygraph scheduled for that day be postponed. The CIA's attitude concerning this request, as revealed in a September 22, 1997 e-mail memorandum prepared by a subordinate of defendant Curran, demonstrates the animus toward plaintiff:
[Ciralsky] poly date is now Friday, 3 Oct. [Name redacted] called and said he had a conflict with the 2nd, and when I call [sic] [Ciralsky] he said that's good because the 2nd is Rosh Hashanah and he was going to call and change it anyway (but he said he was afraid because he didn't want to make me mad!) So now we're on for 3 Oct @ 0900 (all day). [Emphasis original]
Moreover, the fact that Ciralsky’s polygraph was to be an "all day" affair indicates an intent on the part of the CIA defendants to browbeat Ciralsky using the mechanism of the polygraph.
79. From start to finish, polygraph examinations - including pre-test and post-test interrogations - normally run about 2-3 hours. Any decision to extend this timetable is made only in the course of the polygraph. The CIA, however, memorialized ten days in advance how long the October 3, 1997 polygraph was supposed to last, evidencing the illicit nature of its purpose in re-polygraphing Ciralsky on that occasion.
80. In advance of his October 3, 1997 polygraph, Ciralsky sent an e-mail message formally requesting a copy of Polygraph Policies, Procedures, and Standards in the Central Intelligence Agency which, according to Agency Regulation (AR) 10-3, is supposed to be provided to every CIA employee -- upon request -- prior to the administration of a polygraph examination.
81. When confronted with Ciralsky’s written request, defendant Eilenberger’s assistant in charge of security first suggested that such a document did not exist and then claimed that no one in the OPS could locate the polygraph procedures. Finally, she informed Ciralsky that, in any case, he would not be provided with a copy of the regulations in advance of his polygraph (his right to have it prior to undergoing a polygraph examination notwithstanding).
82. Defendants Doe, Curran, Lewis, Calder and Eilenberger violated AR 10-3 by failing to provide a copy of Polygraph Policies, Procedures, and Standards in the Central Intelligence Agency in advance of his October 3, 1997 polygraph, and by frustrating Ciralsky's attempts to obtain the document prior to his examination.
83. On October 3, 1997, Ciralsky was concerned about the nature and scope of a polygraph examination which official CIA records would later reveal to be a sham. Out of an abundance of caution, Ciralsky reviewed the polygraph questions with the polygrapher and requested that he define as precisely as possible what he would ask during the examination. Agency officials would later characterize Ciralsky's appropriate, legitimate caution and detailed analysis as "indicative of deception."
84. In any event, on October 3, 1997, after testing Ciralsky three times in rapid succession, the polygrapher alleged that plaintiff's "heart rate rose in response to questions about Israel." While Ciralsky was secure in the knowledge that he had passed two other polygraphs without his heart rate rising, the polygrapher insisted that he needed "new" information -- in other words an "admission" -- regarding Ciralsky's contacts with Israelis and American-Israeli dual citizens in order to justify Ciralsky's results to the polygraph "quality control." As already referenced, the CIA's polygraph "quality control" had earlier attempted to manipulate Ciralsky's "non-deceptive" results.
85. Having already provided the CIA with all information -- including, when prodded by defendants, conjecture -- regarding American-Israeli dual national and Israeli "contacts" he was under no obligation to either disclose or discuss, Ciralsky was understandably distressed and left the polygraph examination after several hours. No admission was made.
IX. THE CIA AGAIN REFUSES TO INVESTIGATE ITS OWN UNCONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PRACTICES
86. After the October 3, 1997 polygraph examination, on several occasions Ciralsky attempted yet again to raise with defendant Eilenberger his concerns and complaints about CI profiling of observant Jews, disparate treatment and unlawful discrimination toward them. Defendant Eilenberger refused to address or acknowledge these issues, however.
87. His concerns having been ignored once more, on October 16, 1997, Ciralsky sent defendant Eilenberger an e-mail message drawing her attention to "the way [he] was singled out for disparate treatment, the wisdom of subjecting [him] to an aberrant security investigation in light of the treatment [he] had previously been accorded, and the propriety and scope of the CIC/CEG investigation which followed [his] 19 August polygraph."
88. In this October 16, 1997 e-mail to defendant Eilenberger, Ciralsky requested:
a. to review his security file;
b. a copy of any request to OPS that Ciralsky be re-investigated; and
c. answers to his questions posed to Defendant Eilenberger and others.
Since that date (and even before it), Ciralsky has requested the same items from other Agency personnel, including defendants McNamara, Eilenberger, Doe, Curran and Calder.
89. Defendants McNamara, Eilenberger, Doe, Curran and Calder denied Ciralsky's repeated requests to examine his security file and polygraph tapes (and/or transcripts). This was in direct violation of Agency regulations HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b.
90. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on October 20, 1997, Ciralsky received a call from a member of the OPS's Special Activities Staff ("SAS") asking that he attend a 1:00 p.m. meeting that same day. No topic for the meeting was provided. At 10:30 a.m., however, Ciralsky met with defendant McGinn, the complaints attorney for the CIA's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity ("OEEO"), and complained of the disparate treatment and unlawful employment discrimination to which he was being subjected by defendants Eilenberger, Calder, Curran and Doe, among others. Ciralsky explained that he had been improperly singled out for a special security investigation and interrogated at length regarding his family's and his religion and association with American-Jewish causes. Ciralsky told McGinn that, based on his observations concerning his own treatment, CIC/CEG personnel were clearly profiling Jewish employees.
91. Ciralsky had previously raised these concerns in August 1997 -- before the onset of the CIC/CEG investigation -- with McGinn's predecessor, Anne Fisher, who at that time dismissed plaintiff's attempt to raise an informal charge of unlawful employment discrimination with OEEO, advising plaintiff that it was too early to determine why he had been singled out or what could be done about it.
92. On October 20, 1997, however, defendant McGinn told Ciralsky that what he described "didn't sound [to her] like Dawn [Eilenberger]." Still, defendant McGinn, the head of the Agency's OEEO, promised Ciralsky that she would conduct an appropriate investigation into his charges of disparate treatment and unlawful employment discrimination and would respond to Ciralsky within a reasonable time period.
93. Notwithstanding that commitment, defendant McGinn neither conducted an appropriate investigation nor responded in any way to Ciralsky's EEO complaints. This was in clear violation of the EEOC's regulations and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a result, Ciralsky has been denied the opportunity to proceed through the EEO process as provided in 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (the EEOC's regulations for processing and exhausting administratively federal employee EEO claims).
94. Defendant McGinn's efforts to obstruct Ciralsky's efforts to assert an administrative EEO claim went far beyond a refusal to conduct an investigation as required by law (and after promising to do so), however. Representatives from defendant McGinn's OEEO office -- and, upon information and belief, Ms. McGinn personally -- participated in the November 1997 and March 1998 ERPs in which the "insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate" material -- as described by defendant Tenet in an April 13, 1999 letter to the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith ("ADL") - was not only considered, but relied upon in taking adverse action against Ciralsky.
95. In short, the CIA's OEEO not only obstructed Ciralsky's efforts to register his claims of discrimination and obtain relief administratively (and exhaust his administrative remedies if such relief was not effectively obtained), but defendant McGinn and her staff, by their presence at the ERPs, also served as co-conspirators and facilitators of the unlawful employment discrimination and reprisal actions taken against plaintiff by the Agency.
96. The actions by defendant McGinn and her OEEO staff plainly demonstrate that not only does the CIA brazenly discriminate against Jewish employees -- via the use of disparate and unlawful CI and security standards and investigations, but the Agency also ensures that its EEO (and IG) processes are off limits to Ciralsky and others who have suffered as a result of the CIA's discriminatory and unlawful practices.
X. THE AGENCY SUSPENDS CIRALSKY BECAUSE OF HIS STATUS AS A JEW AND HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
97. At the 1:00 p.m. meeting on October 20, 1997, CIA officials told Ciralsky that the Agency had decided to convene an ERP to review his contacts and associations with American-Jewish causes and the State of Israel and to make a recommendation regarding his loyalty to the United States and continued fitness for employment at the Agency (and, for all intents and purposes, anywhere else in the U.S. government).
98. That same day -- October 20, 1997 -- the CIA placed Ciralsky on indefinite administrative leave. Whereupon, the Agency seized his badge and prevented him from returning to his office to collect his belongings. Ciralsky's scheduled promotion was rescinded and his rotation to the NSC was canceled.
99. Defendant Eilenberger advised Ciralsky that she was unsure whether his was a "suitability" or an "eligibility" case. "Suitability" cases deal only with an employee's fitness for a position at the CIA. "Eligibility" cases, on the other hand, concern both an employee's fitness for Agency employment and fitness to hold a security clearance in the CIA or in any federal agency (or even with a government contractor). Though on February 13, 1998, the CIA declared that Ciralsky's associations constituted an "eligibility" case, documents provided by the CIA reveal that as late as March 1998, Agency officials were still referring to his case as one of "suitability."
100. Regardless, the CIA's decision ultimately to classify Ciralsky's case as one of "eligibility" is part of the Agency’s pattern and practice of discriminating against Jewish-Americans who exercise: (a) their religion, (b) their right to express lawful and protected support for American-Jewish causes, and (c) their right to have perfectly unexceptional associations -- well within the bounds of the CIA's own regulations regarding such contact -- with Israelis and American-Israeli dual-nationals.
101. Defendant Eilenberger advised Ciralsky that an Agency representative would review with him the "specific issue" before the ERP. He was further advised that he would have five days to prepare a written statement for consideration by the ERP. Defendant Eilenberger also said that Ciralsky would be allowed counsel and that the CIA would provide any and all information he might require in order to address the "charge" against him. Ciralsky asked Agency officials what position OGC planned to take at the ERP with regard to Ciralsky. The officials replied that OGC would state that Ciralsky was an "outstanding employee."
102. The only issue before the ERP, therefore, was whether Ciralsky, who performed his duties as a CIA attorney with distinction, posed a threat to national security based on his lawful practice of Judaism, his associations with other Jews and American-Jewish causes, associations which:
a. were exempt from disclosure under the CIA's own regulations;
b. were thoroughly investigated and found to be perfectly unexceptional prior to Ciralsky's entry on duty with the CIA;
c. are, like his religious practices, protected by the First Amendment; and
d. are shared by many American Jews.
XI. THE CIA FALSELY CHARGES THAT CIRALSKY IS UNFIT TO HOLD A SECURITY CLEARANCE BECAUSE HE INITIALLY FAILED TO DISCLOSE, AND SHOWED A "LACK OF CANDOR" CONCERNING, ISRAELIS AND AMERICAN-ISRAELI DUAL NATIONALS
103. On the afternoon of October 20, 1997, the CIA notified Ciralsky that the its specific "charge" against him concerned his alleged:
. . . initial failure to disclose, and lack of candor concerning, several foreign or dual national contacts, some of whom [he] knew or suspected had been involved in the Israeli Intelligence Services, Israeli Defense Forces, or other components of the Israeli Government.
104. On October 21, 1997, counsel for Ciralsky requested a list from the CIA of the foreign and dual national contacts Ciralsky had allegedly "failed" initially to disclose and about whom he supposedly showed a "lack of candor." Ciralsky's attorney also requested copies of plaintiff's CI, polygraph and security files, or the opportunity to review such records.
105. The CIA rejected Ciralsky's attorney's request in violation of CIA regulations HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b -- which afford employees like Ciralsky access to, or copies of, their security, polygraph and CI files.
106. On October 31, 1997, the Chief of the CIA's Administrative Law Division identified to Ciralsky's counsel the following individuals who were of "concern" to the Agency:
a. An employee of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation who chaperoned Ciralsky's high school trips to Israel, in 1987 and 1988 -- when Ciralsky was 15 and 16 years old, respectively;
b. Ciralsky's former Hebrew language instructor at George Washington University;
c. Ezer Weizman, the current President of Israel, to whom the Agency determined that Ciralsky is distantly related (through Chaim Weizmann, the First President of Israel, who died in 1952, nineteen years before Ciralsky's birth);
d. Ciralsky's brother's former Israeli host family (dating back to when Ciralsky's brother was on a year-long community service program in Israel sponsored by the Milwaukee Jewish Federation, in 1988);
e. Two United States citizens of Israeli descent who work and reside in the United States (one is a medical doctor, the other a Wall Street investment banker); and
f. The Israeli husband of one of Ciralsky's American college friends.
XII. THE CIA'S CHARGES AGAINST CIRALSKY, LACKING BOTH LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES, ARE CONCOCTED AS A SUBTERFUGE TO OBSCURE THE AGENCY'S DECISION TO REVOKE CIRALSKY'S SECURITY CLEARANCE AND PRECLUDE HIM FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE BECAUSE OF HIS STATUS AS A JEW AND HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, PRACTICES, ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
107. For purposes of the CIA's regulations governing foreign contact reporting, none of the individuals described on October 31, 1997 to Ciralsky's attorney by the Chief of the CIA's Administrative Law Division (identified in ¶106 above), qualifies as having had a "close and continuing" relationship with Ciralsky under Agency Notice ("AN") 10-15-18, HR 10-15, and June 20, 1996 guidance from the Agency’s Recruitment Center.
108. Ciralsky has never met or communicated with Ezer Weizman, the current President of Israel.
109. Moreover, Ciralsky has not seen any of the individuals described by the Chief of the CIA's Administrative Law Division on October 31, 1997 (identified in ¶106 above) since commencing employment with the CIA and, with the exception of one of the U.S. citizens from whom Ciralsky infrequently received e-mails, has not communicated in any way with these individuals since at least 1994.
110. CIA regulations state that contacts with dual nationals need not be reported by Agency employees as they are United States citizens. See AN 10-15-18, at Fn. 1. Moreover, exchanging e-mail does not constitute a "contact." See Attachment to AN 10-15-18, at ¶ 2(b).
111. Accordingly, under the CIA's own regulations, Ciralsky was not (and is not) obligated to disclose or discuss any of the Israelis or American-Israelis cited by the Agency as being central to the supposed "charges" against him.
112. Although he was not required to report these individuals, when OPS polygraphers and CIC/CEG officers interrogated Ciralsky about his (and his family's) associations with American-Jewish causes and his student travel to Israel, in August, September and October of 1997, Ciralsky candidly discussed the individuals referenced above.
113. Despite Ciralsky's cooperation, the CIA imposed upon him a retroactive and unlawful disclosure obligation contrary to the Agency's own guidance and regulations, as well as contrary to Executive Order 12333 which prohibits the CIA from collecting intelligence on American citizens within the United States. Defendants imposed this obligation on Ciralsky as a pretext for their decision to revoke his security clearance, terminate him from the CIA's employ and preclude him from federal employment all because of his religious beliefs and his religious and ethnic associations.
114. The treatment accorded Ciralsky by defendants also establishes that a Jewish CIA employee who, consistent with regulations, does not disclose contacts with Israelis and/or American-Israelis which are not "close and continuing," will nevertheless later be held accountable for that non-disclosure in the event the CIA requires a pretext for his or her termination.
115. The CIA has applied, and continues to apply, a disparate and discriminatory standard of conduct to Ciralsky based upon his lawful and constitutionally protected beliefs and associations in knowing violation of firm constitutional principles and specific statutory prohibitions.
116. Upon information and belief, no non-Jewish CIA employee has ever been subjected to an ERP or Personnel Evaluation Board ("PEB") based upon contacts which, in addition to being lawful and constitutionally protected, preceded his or her employment with the CIA and were not and are not "close and continuing" for purposes of the CIA's own reporting requirements.
117. In Ciralsky's case, the CIA has opted to treat his minimal, legitimate and constitutionally-protected "contacts" with Israelis and American-Israelis -- all of which preceded his tenure at CIA -- as an "eligibility" issue, thereby jeopardizing both his job at CIA and his ability to hold a security clearance with other federal agencies or with government contractors.
118. At all times, Ciralsky has complied with Agency guidance and regulations concerning the need to disclose "close and continuing" contacts with foreign nationals. The CIA's accusation that he exhibited a "lack of candor" concerning contacts he was not obliged to report is a disingenuous attempt to legitimize defendants' unlawful conduct of subjecting Jewish-Americans to disparate, discriminatory and unlawful treatment, treatment that is in knowing violation of the Constitution and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
119. To date, the CIA has neither defined "lack of candor" nor has it described which, if any, CIA regulations were violated by Ciralsky's supposed "lack of candor." In addition, the CIA has yet to produce a single CIA regulation which mentions "lack of candor" much less provides that "lack of candor" is grounds for discharging an employee of the CIA.
120. Under Director of Central Intelligence Directive ("DCID") 1/14, which governs access to SCI, "lack of candor" is not one of the enumerated grounds for revoking an employee's security clearance. Not being mentioned, however, does make "lack of candor" a convenient pretext for discriminatory and other unlawful conduct toward Jewish employees of the Agency -- like Ciralsky.
121. The CIA's allegation that Ciralsky showed a "lack of candor" is in any event absurd in light of the twenty or more hours of interrogations he endured regarding his legitimate and perfectly unexceptional associations, the hundreds of man-hours he was obliged to spend responding to pernicious allegations of dual loyalty, and the voluminous documentation he offered to provide, and did provide, to the CIA concerning these associations.
122. In fact, in the face of a patently discriminatory and constitutionally-flawed "investigation," Ciralsky demonstrated an unassailable degree of candor and cooperation. Despite all efforts to be fully cooperative, Ciralsky is nevertheless accused of being less than candid.
123. As of this filing, and despite promises to the contrary, neither defendant Eilenberger nor defendant McGinn, nor any other CIA official, has undertaken an investigation into Ciralsky's charges of ethnic profiling and stereotyping against Jewish employees, and disparate treatment and unlawful employment discrimination against this class of Americans. Rather, Agency officials retaliated against Ciralsky for making these charges and protesting the unlawful conduct of defendants that give rise to them.
XIII. THE CIA USES AN "EMPLOYEE REVIEW PANEL" TO FURTHER ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ULTRA VIRES EFFORTS AGAINST CIRALSKY
124. The patently discriminatory charges leveled against Ciralsky have been compounded and aggravated by the administrative "process" created by the CIA to evaluate them. The ERP, which the Agency ultimately convened on November 14, 1997 purportedly to decide Ciralsky's allegiance to the United States and his ability to hold a security clearance, constituted an investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative body wrapped into one.
125. Among those participating in the ERP were individuals directly responsible for Ciralsky's mistreatment. In addition, the ERP process was constitutionally flawed in at least the following respects:
a. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied the right to notice of when and where the ERP was meeting;
b. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied the right to appear before the ERP;
c. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied the right to examine, much less an opportunity to refute, the "evidence" presented before the ERP;
d. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied the right to examine Ciralsky's CI, polygraph and security files;
e. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied the right to examine tapes and transcripts of Ciralsky's polygraph examinations and CIC/CEG interrogations;
f. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied copies of, or the opportunity to review, the "Foreign Contact Information Forms" Ciralsky brought to his July 1996 polygraph; and
g. Ciralsky and his counsel were denied copies of, or the opportunity to review, Agency documents (created by OPS and/or CIC/CEG) concerning American-Israeli dual national and Israeli "contacts" Ciralsky reported to the Agency.
126. The ERP, which presumably was purported to ensure that Ciralsky received procedural due process, had in fact the purpose and effect of denying him a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" -- thereby denying him due process.
127. The CIA's refusal to allow Ciralsky and his counsel the opportunity to examine his security file and polygraph tapes (and/or transcripts) in anticipation of the ERP expressly violated Agency regulations HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b as well as Ciralsky’s Fifth Amendment right to know the "charges" and "evidence" against him. The fact that the CIA refused Ciralsky and his counsel's repeated requests to appear before the ERP underscores the unlawful, indeed, constitutionally flawed, nature of the process.
128. Following the November 1997 ERP, defendants Tenet, Doe, Curran, Lewis, Calder and Eilenberger unleashed "investigators" in an apparent attempt to manufacture "evidence" to support the Agency's original "charges" against Ciralsky.
129. On February 13, 1998, nearly three months after the ERP convened, Ciralsky's counsel received a letter from the CIA's Acting Director of Personnel Security, acknowledging that CIA officials had misled Ciralsky about the basis for, and scope of, the CIA's and FBI's "investigation" and, in turn, the nature of the "charges" before the ERP.
130. On or about March 6, 1998, some four months after the first ERP, the CIA convened a second ERP. Like its predecessor, this second ERP had absolutely no procedural safeguards (as discussed in ¶125 above) and defendants again denied Ciralsky a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
XIV. THE CIA ANNOUNCES ITS DECISION TO REVOKE CIRALSKY'S SECURITY CLEARANCE, BUT REFUSES TO DIVULGE THE DETAILS OF THAT DECISION
131. On July 6, 1998, the CIA informed Ciralsky that it had made an "initial security decision" to revoke his "Top Secret" security clearance and SCI access. In explanation of this decision, the CIA provided Ciralsky with: an MFR dated July 2, 1998, from the Director of the Center for CIA Security, which purportedly sets forth the basis for revoking his security clearance; heavily redacted portions of his security and CI files.
132. By its own terms, however, the July 2, 1998 MFR did not constitute the comprehensive basis for the CIA's adverse personnel action. Rather, as the Director of the Center for CIA Security notes in the MFR: "I have also attached a classified annex that provides additional information regarding the case." Despite multiple requests for its production, this "classified annex" has never been shared with Ciralsky or counsel.
133. Thus, after misleading Ciralsky and counsel about the genesis and scope of the "investigation" and disciplinary "process" against Ciralsky, and obliging him to defend himself against "charges" which themselves were red herrings, defendants Tenet, McNamara, Doe, Curran, Calder, Eilenberger and McGinn conveniently relied upon purportedly "secret" information in rendering their adverse personnel decision concerning him.
134. While flawed for the reasons stated above, the July 2, 1998 MFR is nonetheless significant since the "charges" upon which the CIA predicated its adverse disciplinary action against Ciralsky are so distorted that they fail of their own volition. According to the CIA, the basis for convening an ERP was Ciralsky's alleged:
initial failure to disclose, and lack of candor concerning, several foreign or dual national contacts, some of whom [he] knew or suspected had been involved in the Israeli Intelligence Services, Israeli Defense Forces, or other components of the Israeli Government.
135. In the July 2, 1998 MFR, however, the CIA’s Director for the Center for CIA Security (who reports to defendant Calder) concedes:
The ERP members agreed with Mr. Ciralsky that he did not have an obligation to report his contacts with foreign nationals under the requirement to report close and continuing contacts. The requirement applies only to Agency employees, and he had no contact that met the definition of close and continuing contact while an Agency employee.
Members of the ERP also agreed that he did not have to list dual national contacts at EOD [entrance-on-duty].
136. Hence, the "charge" against Ciralsky is that he allegedly showed a "lack of candor" about individuals whom, according to CIA regulations and officials, he was not required to disclose or discuss. This non-duty "duty" -- which the defendants have unilaterally and retroactively applied to Ciralsky as a Jewish employee -- is an act of employment discrimination against him.
137. Moreover, the July 2, 1998 MFR suggests that Ciralsky should have known that the CIA was deceiving him about the "routine" nature of its so-called "investigation" and, therefore, that he should have sua sponte divulged to Agency officials any information, however dubious or fragmentary, about any contact with any Israeli or American-Israeli dual national, irrespective of whether or not they were "close and continuing."
138. Therefore, the new, unwritten and previously undisclosed rule seems to be that when a loyal and successful Jewish employee, like Ciralsky, is singled out for and lied to about an investigation which focuses exclusively on his and his family's lawful and constitutionally protected religious and ethnic associations, he is supposed to disregard rules and regulations which apply to non-Jewish employees and recite conjectural information about individuals with whom the employee had neither a close nor continuing relationship.
XV. THE CIA REFUSES CIRALSKY DUE PROCESS IN THE AGENCY'S APPEALS PROCESS
139. At a July 6, 1998 meeting with CIA officials, Ciralsky announced his intention to appeal the "initial security decision" revoking his security clearance. The Agency's "appeals process" involves a request to the Director of the Center for CIA Security for reconsideration of his initial decision, and then reconsideration of the initial decision by a three-person panel comprised of the CIA’s Executive Director, its General Counsel (defendant McNamara) and its Chief of CIC (defendant Doe).
140. At no point in either the ERP or the "appeals process" is Ciralsky or his counsel allowed to appear before an Agency decision-maker. Moreover, as noted above, in arguing the "appeal" Ciralsky and counsel are once again obliged to respond to a bill of particulars which the CIA admits is not comprehensive and is itself contradicted by the investigative file provided to Ciralsky on July 6, 1998.
141. The ERP process in this matter, including the appeal process, was a charade, as was the investigation which purportedly gave rise to it, especially given defendant Tenet's apparent instructions to his subordinates on or before September 19, 1997 to terminate Ciralsky - before Ciralsky was even informed of, much less given an opportunity to respond to, the charges against him.
142. Since October 1997, Ciralsky has made multiple requests for copies of, or the opportunity to review, the unredacted security and CI files on him, including the so-called "classified annex" which forms the "comprehensive basis" for the Agency's decision to revoke his security clearance. The CIA has refused all of Ciralsky's and his counsel's requests in this regard, citing as a justification the fact that Ciralsky no longer has a security clearance and thus cannot see his own classified security file. Yet, Ciralsky made repeated requests in person and in writing to see his files before he was placed on administrative leave and thus while he retained all of his security clearances. Moreover, only Ciralsky's "TOP SECRET" and SCI access (and not his SECRET clearance) were revoked -- and no document in Ciralsky's files is classified above "SECRET". As such, Ciralsky was cleared to see not only the comprehensive ERP decision revoking his clearance, but the CI, security and polygraph files which the CIA refused to provide him in violation of Agency regulations HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b. What is more, after granting Ciralsky'’s counsel a security clearance, the CIA refused to allow Ciralsky's lawyer to review a single classified document related to this case.
143. Defendants Tenet, Freeh, Lewis, McNamara, Doe, Curran, Calder, Eilenberger and McGinn, acting individually and collectively, have abused and continue to abuse security classification in order to deny Ciralsky due process. Their conduct is inconsistent both with the Fifth Amendment and Executive Order 12958 which prohibits the classification of material so as to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, and administrative error, or prevent embarrassment to agency officials, or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
XVI. THE CIA TWICE EXTENDS CIRALSKY'S CONTRACT, BUT REFUSES TO ALLOW HIM TO RETURN TO WORK AND WITHHOLDS HIS PAY
144. On November 30, 1998, the CIA unilaterally extended Ciralsky's two-year employment contract with the Agency which expired that day. In doing so, the Agency indefinitely obligated Ciralsky to abide by all security requirements.
145. Ciralsky remained on administrative leave -- with his scheduled promotions still frozen -- under the CIA's equivalent of home detention: he was unable to travel anywhere outside the United States without Agency approval, and he was obligated to call into the CIA every morning before 9:30 a.m. so that the Agency officials could keep tabs on him. Moreover, the contract extension precluded Ciralsky from seeking or obtaining other employment and from making any public statements (oral or written) without the CIA's express permission.
146. Via letter dated February 25, 1999, the CIA informed Ciralsky that the CIA had once again unilaterally and indefinitely extended his contract. At the same time that the CIA indefinitely obligated Ciralsky to abide by the aforementioned onerous requirements, however, defendant McNamara stripped him of his salary and placed him in a leave without pay ("LWOP") status.
147. The Agency did not pay Ciralsky from March 1, 1999 until December 13, 1999, thereby breaching its obligations to him and unilaterally altering material terms of his employment contract with the Agency. For his part, Ciralsky remained ready, willing and able to return to work and abided by all contract provisions.
148. As before, during the nine-month period in which the Agency unilaterally and indefinitely extended his contract without pay, Ciralsky could not obtain outside employment without the CIA's consent, travel outside the United States without notifying the Agency in advance, or publish or publicly utter anything without the CIA's consent. Ciralsky suffered extreme financial hardship as a result of this situation imposed upon him by defendants.
XVII. THE CIA RETALIATES AGAINST CIRALSKY BECAUSE OF MEDIA REPORTS CONCERNING ITS UNLAWFUL AND DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS
149. On March 22, 1999, Ciralsky, through his attorney, requested that the Department of Justice initiate an investigation of certain CIA officials for criminal violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552a.
150. On the morning of April 9, 1999, National Public Radio ("NPR") aired a lengthy segment about the anti-Semitic treatment accorded Ciralsky and other Jewish-Americans by the Defendants.
151. Later on April 9, 1999, NPR reported that U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno had ordered a Justice Department investigation into charges that top CIA officials had violated Ciralsky's rights under the First Amendment and the Privacy Act.
152. Within hours of the April 9, 1999 NPR broadcasts, defendants Tenet, McNamara, Doe, Curran, Calder, Eilenberger and McGinn took additional adverse action against Ciralsky by summarily affirming the ERP decision of July 2, 1998 which, by the Agency's own admission, was predicated upon documents which -- in the words of NPR -- are "laced with anti-Semitic stereotypes."
153. The CIA's actions, as noted in ¶152 above, were clearly retaliatory -- that is, they were an effort to punish and intimidate Ciralsky for reporting unlawful conduct by Agency officials to the Attorney General, something Ciralsky was obliged to do both as a CIA attorney and as an officer of the court.
XVIII. DEFENDANT TENET AND OTHER CIA OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT THE AGENCY'S ACTIONS REGARDING CIRALSKY WERE "INSENSITIVE, UNPROFESSIONAL AND HIGHLY INAPPROPRIATE," BUT THE CIA STILL REFUSES TO REMEDY THEM
154. In an April 13, 1999 letter to the ADL, defendant Tenet acknowledged that the language used by high-ranking CIA and FBI officials to describe and disparage Ciralsky and his family was "insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate." In an April 15, 1999 statement to the Washington Jewish Week, CIA spokesman William Harlow elaborated upon defendant Tenet's admission, noting that the Agency had "heartburn" with the way in which Ciralsky, his family and other "rich Jewish friends" were mocked in official CIA records.
155. Notwithstanding the admissions and statements set forth in ¶154 above, defendants refuse to counteract the discriminatory and unlawful administrative, CI and security processes and determinations concerning plaintiff which -- according to Agency officials -- were predicated upon the "insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate" records, or to discipline the authors of those records for committing to writing their belief that if an American citizen is openly Jewish, practices the Jewish faith, and supports lawful Jewish causes, either in word or in deed, he or she is a threat to American national security.
156. Defendants' continued inaction in this regard evidences a clear intent on their part to countenance plainly "insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate" -- i.e., anti-Semitic -- practices at the CIA.
XIX. DEFENDANTS ACTIONS CONCERNING CIRALSKY CONSTITUTE KNOWING AND INTENTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS, AS WELL AS EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND BINDING REGULATIONS
157. Defendants have acted with no justification, willfully, and with malice towards Ciralsky, in flagrant disregard of his clearly established rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and in violation of Executive Orders 12333, 12958 and 12968, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and Privacy Acts, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, and a host of CIA and FBI Regulations, including AR 10-3, HR 10-3, HR 10-15, AR 10-15-18, HHB 70-1, HR 10-8b, Polygraph Policies, Procedures, and Standards in the Central Intelligence Agency, and DCID 1/14.
158. The CIA and FBI maintain patently anti-Semitic CI and security policies and practices directed at Jewish Americans in the national security establishment.
159. These policies and practices have focused and continue to focus on observant Jews who have traveled to Israel and/or have contacts, ties or associations with Israel and/or legitimate Jewish causes and charities.
160. CIA and FBI officials have singled out Jewish Americans in the national security establishment, including Ciralsky, for disparate, improper and unlawful security and CI scrutiny and treatment.
161. Within the past several years, Jewish Americans, including Ciralsky have:
a. been improperly targeted by the CIA and FBI because of their race and/or religion;
b. been asked to consent to purportedly "routine" security "investigations" and/or "re-investigations" under false pretenses;
c. been subjected to abusive polygraph examinations and CI interrogations during which they are harassed about contacts and associations with other Jews, Jewish causes and/ or Jewish charities;
d. been wrongfully accused of "deception" and "lack of candor" with regard to their contacts and associations with other Jews and Jewish causes and Jewish charities; and
e. had their careers at the CIA, in government service and otherwise destroyed or put in limbo.
162. There is no evidence that the CIA's and FBI's current policies and practices against Jewish Americans will cease without the intervention of this Court.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
CLAIM I: Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution -- Denial of Equal Protection
163. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees every citizen equal protection of the laws.
164. Ciralsky is Jewish. Jews are considered a distinct race and religion for equal protection purposes.
165. At all relevant times, defendants, and each of them, were aware that Ciralsky is Jewish.
166. Defendants have systematically and unlawfully deprived Ciralsky and other Jewish-Americans of equal protection of the laws by holding them to separate, distinct and far more onerous CI and security requirements and standards and by subjecting them to constitutionally-repugnant investigations, interrogations, and searches and seizures based upon their status as Jews.
167. Defendants have deprived Jewish Americans in the national security community, including plaintiff, of equal protection of the laws by subjecting them to, inter alia, discriminatory and otherwise unlawful security and CI "investigations" and "re-investigations", unlawful custodial interrogations and polygraph examinations, unlawful searches and seizures, religious baiting and browbeating, and knowingly false accusations of "deception" and "lack of candor" relating to lawful and protected religious beliefs and practices and wholly lawful religious and ethnic associations.
168. Defendants also deprived Ciralsky as a Jewish American of equal protection of the laws by, inter alia:
a. taking adverse personnel, security and CI actions against Ciralsky on account of his status as a Jew and his (and his family's) religious beliefs and practices and his (and their) religious and ethnic associations;
b. making deleterious assumptions about Ciralsky's fitness for government employment on the basis of his status as a Jew and his religious beliefs and practices and his religious and ethnic associations, all in violation of Executive Order 12968;
c. employing disparate and discriminatory standards to evaluate Ciralsky's fitness to hold a security clearance and to serve in government;
d. referring to Ciralsky in U.S. government records as a "rich" and "hard-line" Jew whose activities constituted "pro-Israeli baggage" and a "CI issue" deserving of special treatment;
e. harassing and ridiculing Ciralsky about his (and his family's) religious beliefs and practices and his (and their) religious and ethnic associations during unlawful custodial counterespionage interrogations and rigged polygraph examinations;
f. subjecting Ciralsky to unlawful electronic surveillance on account of his lawful First Amendment activity; and
g. threatening to seek the revocation of Ciralsky's license to practice law in the event that Ciralsky - in an effort to vindicate his equal protection rights -- filed the instant Complaint.
169. By the foregoing actions, defendants acted jointly and severally to deprive Ciralsky, as well as other Jewish Americans, of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
170. Ciralsky has been injured by reason of the defendants' denying him equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth Amendment, including but not limited to by the decimation of his government legal career, denial of salary and promotion, and by limiting his future promotional opportunities, and by foreclosing public and private sector employment opportunities.
171. Ciralsky has also suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, personal humiliation, resentment, loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, and other personal injuries as a result of the defendants denying him equal protection of the law.
172. Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for any of the unconstitutional acts alleged hereinabove, for each of them knew, or had reason to know, that their behavior toward and with respect to plaintiff violated the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the law, including rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, Executive Order 12968, and CIA and FBI internal regulations. Therefore, defendants and each of them waived any qualified immunity that they may have had for performing discretionary functions which constitute the actions complained of herein. Moreover, no reasonable official in the position of these defendants could have believed that his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established laws, Executive Orders, CIA and FBI regulations, and the laws arising from and interpretations of the Constitution and Amendments thereto.
173. For the foregoing reasons, individual-sued defendants are liable in their personal capacities, as well as in their official capacities, for depriving Ciralsky of equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States while acting in their official capacities. Such defendants are therefore liable individually to Ciralsky for compensatory damages.
174. As the complained-of conduct of the individually-sued defendants was intentional and motivated by discriminatory and/or retaliatory intent and/or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of Ciralsky protected under the Constitution of the United States, statutes, Executive Orders, and CIA and FBI internal regulations, such defendants are also liable to Ciralsky for punitive damages.
CLAIM II: Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution -- Procedural Due Process
175. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
176. As agencies in the Executive Branch of the government of the United States, the CIA and the FBI are required to uphold the guarantee of due process of law of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
177. Ciralsky's liberty and property interests include: (a) his freedom to practice the Jewish religion, (b) his freedom to associate with others of his faith, (c) his freedom to speak and express himself, (d) his right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures by federal officials, (e) his right against self-incrimination (and attempts by federal officials to compel confessions), (f) his professional and personal standing; (g) his reputation; (h) his right to engage in the practice of law without improper interference, or the threat of interference, from federal officials; (i) his right to future employment; (j) his livelihood; (k) career progression; (l) continued federal employment absent a showing of good cause for dismissal; and (m) merited assignments and promotions without interference by federal officials in violation of federal law or agency policy, procedures and regulations.
178. Through their "investigation" of him, as well as the ERPs and the termination of his employment which followed, defendants negatively altered Ciralsky's employment status and stigmatized and impugned his reputation so as to: (a) seriously damage his standing and associations in the community, and (b) foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities by excluding him from a definite range of employment opportunities with the government and broadly precluding him from continuing in his chosen career.
179. Defendants deprived Ciralsky of his liberty and property interests when they set in motion a discriminatory "investigation" (and/or "re-investigation") of plaintiff the outcome of which was predetermined and the tenor and conduct of which were virulently anti-Semitic. Moreover, defendants obstructed Ciralsky's efforts to timely invoke and/or exhaust the adminstrative EEO complaint process under 29 C.F.R. Part 1614.
180. In the course of the "investigation" of plaintiff, on three separate occasions defendants sought, induced and obtained Ciralsky' waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under false pretenses. Ciralsky involuntarily waived his rights in connection with the CIA's rigged polygraph examinations based upon defendants' false representations about the "routine" nature of the polygraph and because failure to waive his rights would have resulted in the immediate loss of livelihood.
181. Furthermore, also in the course of the "investigation" Ciralsky was forced -- once again under false pretenses -- to submit to three or more custodial interrogations conducted by CIA and FBI officials in the CIC/CEG. In each of these instances, defendants neither read nor informed Ciralsky of, nor gave him an opportunity to waive, his Miranda rights in conjunction with the repeated attempts to browbeat him for an admission of criminal wrongdoing. Ciralsky's adamant refusal to make such a false admission was later cited by defendants as "evidence" of his "lack of candor."
182. The custodial nature of the CIC/CEG interrogations of plaintiff was evidenced by, among other things, the fact that refusal by Ciralsky to submit to the interrogations would have resulted in the immediate loss of his livelihood, the fact that the interrogations were ordered and directed by an FBI official (defendant Curran), the fact that everything Ciralsky said (and even what he did not say) was used against him by the CIA and forwarded to the FBI, and the fact that the interrogators' contemporaneous written comments unequivocally stated that they "got into his face" and that Ciralsky's "chair was backed against the wall."
183. Defendants further deprived Ciralsky of his liberty and property interests without according him due process of law when, again acting in their official capacities, they convened a disciplinary proceeding called an ERP in which investigative and prosecutorial and adjudicative functions were commingled, where participants deliberated and made decision in secret and anonymously, and where the outcome was determined in advance. In this process, Ciralsky was denied the right to notice and a hearing, the right to know the actual "charges" against him, to confront the "evidence" against him (and to know which evidence, if any, the ERP considered), to cross-examine such witnesses and to put on evidence in his favor, the right to an impartial trier of fact (whose identity is known).
184. In fact, the very outcome of the ERP - which was supposed to protect Ciralsky’s procedural due process -- was preordained by none other than the DCI himself, defendant Tenet, who, upon information and belief, issued orders to his subordinates -- the other defendants -- to find a way to terminate Ciralsky employment with the CIA for a "lack of candor."
185. In view of the foregoing, defendants' actions had the purpose and effect of depriving Ciralsky of his property and liberty without according him procedural due process as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, as such actions by defendants constituted inherently discriminatory investigations and disciplinary proceedings, they violated and otherwise failed to comply with myriad Executive Orders, regulations, policies and procedures including, but not limited to, Executive Orders 12958, 12968 and 12333; DCID 1/14; and CIA regulations HR 10-15, AR 10-15-18, AR 10-3, HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b, and Polygraph Policies, Procedures, and Standards in the Central Intelligence Agency (pursuant to HR 10-3).
186. Defendants further violated Ciralsky’s Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process by threatening to seek the revocation of his license to practice law in the event he filed the instant civil action.
187. By the foregoing acts, defendants deprived Ciralsky of his liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
188. Ciralsky has been injured by reason of the defendants' denying him procedural due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment, including but not limited to by the decimation of his government legal career, denial of salary and promotion, and by limiting his future promotional opportunities, and by foreclosing public and private sector employment opportunities.
189. Ciralsky has also suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, personal humiliation, resentment, loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, and other personal injuries as a result of the defendants denying him procedural due process of law.
190. Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for any of the unconstitutional acts alleged hereinabove, for each of them knew, or had reason to know, that their behavior toward and with respect to plaintiff violated the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the law, including rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, Executive Orders 12958 and 12968, and CIA and FBI internal regulations. Therefore, defendants and each of them waived any qualified immunity that they may have had for performing discretionary functions which constitute the actions complained of herein. Moreover, no reasonable official in the position of these defendants could have believed that his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established laws, Executive Orders, CIA and FBI regulations, and the laws arising from and interpretations of the Constitution.
191. For the foregoing reasons, individual-sued defendants are liable in their personal capacities, as well as in their official capacities, for depriving Ciralsky of procedural due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States while acting in their official capacities. Such defendants are therefore liable individually to Ciralsky for compensatory damages.
192. As the complained-of conduct of the individually-sued defendants was intentional and motivated by discriminatory and/or retaliatory intent and/or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of Ciralsky protected under the Constitution of the United States, statutes, Executive Orders, and CIA and FBI internal regulations, such defendants are also liable to Ciralsky for punitive damages.
CLAIM III: Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution -- Freedoms of Association, Expression, Religion, Speech and to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances
193. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits the government from interfering with, abridging, or otherwise discriminating against a person on the basis of that individual's associations, expression, religion or speech.
194. Ciralsky has engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment including, inter alia: (a) by observing his Jewish faith; (b) by associating with other Jews and lawful Jewish causes and charities; (c) by freely expressing his religious beliefs and convictions; (d) by raising the disparate, discriminatory, improper and unlawful conduct of CIA and FBI officials in e-mail messages, memoranda and other written submissions to, and conversations with, defendants; and (e) by reporting defendants’ criminal conduct to the Attorney General of the United States.
195. Defendants, and each of them, while acting within their official capacities as federal officials, have interfered with, abridged, and otherwise discriminated against Ciralsky on account of his exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
196. Defendants, jointly and severally, while acting within their official capacities as federal officials, have also engaged in a pattern of retaliation against Ciralsky for exercising his First Amendment rights. The retaliatory conduct includes, but is not limited to, initiating investigations, re-investigations and disciplinary proceedings against Ciralsky, subjecting Ciralsky to hostile custodial interrogations and polygraph examinations, placing Ciralsky on indefinite administrative leave, foreclosing public and private sector employment opportunities to him, decimating his legal career, and threatening to seek the revocation of his license to practice law if he filed the instant civil action to vindicate his rights.
197. Defendants have conceded that the ERP considered and relied upon "insensitive, unprofessional and highly inappropriate" documents which condemn Ciralsky, his family and other "rich Jewish" individuals on account of their lawful First Amendment activity, including the practice of their religion. Thus, Ciralsky's exercise of his First Amendment rights, according to defendants, clearly formed the basis for the decision to revoke his security clearance, block his career development as a CIA attorney at which he excelled, and involuntarily terminate him from employment with the CIA.
198. Moreover, defendants accelerated their unlawful and clearly retaliatory efforts to strip Ciralsky of his security clearance and CIA position after they learned on April 9, 1999 that U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno had initiated a criminal inquiry into their (defendants') conduct in this matter.
199. By the foregoing, defendants, acting jointly and severally while within their respective official capacities as federal officials, interfered with, abridged, and otherwise discriminated and retaliated against Ciralsky on account of his religious beliefs and practices, his religious and ethnic associations, and/or his speech and expressive behavior, all in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
200. Ciralsky has been injured by reason of the defendants' violations of his First Amendment rights, including by but not limited to the decimation of his government legal career, denial of salary and promotion, and by limiting his future promotional opportunities, and by foreclosing public and private sector employment opportunities.
201. Ciralsky has also suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, personal humiliation, resentment, loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, and other personal injuries as a result of the defendants' violations of his First Amendment rights.
202. Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for any of the unconstitutional acts alleged hereinabove, for each of them knew, or had reason to know, that their behavior toward and with respect to plaintiff violated the rights guaranteed to plaintiff under the First Amendment to the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, Executive Orders 12968, and CIA and FBI internal regulations. Therefore, defendants and each of them waived any qualified immunity that they may have had for performing discretionary functions which constitute the actions complained of herein. Moreover, no reasonable federal official in the position of these defendants could have believed that his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established laws, Executive Orders, CIA and FBI regulations, and the laws arising from and interpretations of the Constitution.
203. For the foregoing reasons, individual-sued defendants are liable in their personal capacities, as well as in their official capacities, violating Ciralsky's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States while acting in their official capacities. Such defendants are therefore liable individually to Ciralsky for compensatory damages.
204. As the complained-of conduct of the individually-sued defendants was intentional and motivated by discriminatory and/or retaliatory intent and/or reckless or callous indifference to Ciralsky's First Amendment rights, statutes, Executive Orders, and CIA and FBI internal regulations, such defendants are also liable to plaintiff for punitive damages.
CLAIM IV: Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution -- Unlawful Search and Seizure
205. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects an individual's right to be secure in his or her person, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The government may not violate an individual's rights in this regard without a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, based upon probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and which particularly describes the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
206. Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities provides that the CIA may not engage in electronic surveillance against American citizens within the United States.
207. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq., provides that the FBI may engage in electronic surveillance and non-consensual physical searches against a person within the United States provided there is probable cause to believe that he or she is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. However, no person within United States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
208. Upon information and belief, defendants, acting jointly and severally each in his or her capacity as a federal official, on or about December 10, 1996, directed that Ciralsky be subjected to electronic surveillance both at work and at home and that his personal possessions both at work and at home be searched. Also upon information and belief, Ciralsky's home and work phones were tapped and his residence, automobile and personal possessions were searched, all without probable cause or the issuance of a warrant.
209. On September 11, 1997, government officers from the CIA's CIC/CEG provided Ciralsky with a laptop computer and specifically instructed him to keep the computer with him at all times -- at home and at work -- ostensibly so that he could record information about his associations with Israelis and America-Israeli dual nationals as instructed. Ciralsky was also provided an "electronic media pass" -- something ordinarily reserved for a select group of CIA employees who maintain the Agency's sensitive computer network.
210. Upon information and belief, the laptop computer which CIA officials supplied to Ciralsky on September 11, 1997 and which Ciralsky was obliged to keep near or on his person until September 29, 1997, was equipped with data and voice "trap" (i.e., electronic surveillance) capabilities.
211. As the provision of the CIC/CEG laptop computer to Ciralsky was warrantless, it constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as of Executive Order 12333 and 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., and is a criminal offense under 50 U.S.C. § 1809.
212. Indeed, even if the provision of the computer to Ciralsky was pursuant to a warrant, it nevertheless amounted to a violation of the Fourth Amendment and 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. since Ciralsky was being investigated and electronically surveilled on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, specifically his lawful and protected religious beliefs and practices and his religious and ethnic associations.
213. By the foregoing, defendants, acting jointly and severally while within their respective official capacities as federal officials, interfered with, abridged and otherwise deprive Ciralsky of rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Defendants' aforementioned conduct likewise violated 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. and Executive Order 12333.
214. Ciralsky has been injured by reason of the defendants' violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, including by but not limited to the decimation of his government legal career, denial of salary and promotion, and by limiting his future promotional opportunities, and by foreclosing public and private sector employment opportunities.
215. Ciralsky has also suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, personal humiliation, resentment, loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, and other personal injuries as a result of the defendants' violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.
216. As the complained-of conduct of the individually-sued defendants was intentional and motivated by discriminatory and/or retaliatory intent and/or reckless or callous indifference to Ciralsky's Fourth Amendment rights, statutes, and Executive Order, such defendants are also liable to plaintiff for punitive damages.
217. Moreover, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. entitles Ciralsky to actual damages, not less than liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100 per day for each day of a violation, whichever is greater, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other investigation and litigation costs reasonably incurred.
218. Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for any of the unconstitutional acts alleged hereinabove, for each of them knew, or had reason to know, that their behavior toward and with respect to plaintiff violated the rights guaranteed to plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. and Executive Order 12333. Therefore, defendants and each of them waived any qualified immunity that they may have had for performing discretionary functions which constitute the actions complained of herein. Moreover, no reasonable federal official in the position of these defendants could have believed that his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established laws, Executive Orders, and the laws arising from and interpretations of the Constitution.
219. For the foregoing reasons, individual-sued defendants are liable in their personal capacities, as well as in their official capacities, violating Ciralsky's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States while acting in their official capacities. Such defendants are therefore liable individually to Ciralsky for compensatory damages.
CLAIM V: Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution -- Substantive Due Process
220. Defendants, acting jointly and severally each in his or her capacity as a federal official, have interfered, and continue to interfere, with Ciralsky's Fifth Amendment protected liberty interests and property rights in an irrational, arbitrary and capricious manner.
221. After Ciralsky complained in writing and in person to CIA management about disparate, discriminatory, improper and unlawful treatment, defendants subjected him to coercive and discriminatory investigations and polygraphs, accused him of an "initial failure to disclose" and a "lack of candor", placed him on indefinite administrative leave, subjected him to unlawful disciplinary proceedings and processes, and stripped him of his security clearance and employment.
222. The CIA's polygraph program is arbitrary, capricious and irrational, and had the purpose and effect of violating Ciralsky's substantive due process rights, rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
223. Ciralsky underwent and successfully completed CI polygraphs in 1993, 1996 and 1998. Ciralsky's answers have consistently been deemed to be "strongly non-deceptive." Yet when -- based on defendants' false pretenses -- Ciralsky submitted to polygraph examinations in August and October of 1997, he was accused of "deception" with regard to issues and events which pre-dated, and hence were covered by, his "strongly non-deceptive" polygraphs.
224. More importantly, Agency documents reveal that Ciralsky's "deceptive" polygraph "results" were predetermined. Far from being an objective, scientific test and an opportunity for Ciralsky to prove his innocence, the CIA skewed Ciralsky's polygraph "results" to justify his dismissal from the Agency's employ based on a claimed "lack of candor."
225. Skewed results, were not enough for defendants, however. The CIA polygraph examiners, under direction from defendants, repeatedly tried to coerce Ciralsky into confessing that his ethnic and religious associations were improper or illegal.
226. Ciralsky refused to make a false confession and instead asked to see a polygraph supervisor about the polygrapher's abusive, discriminatory and unlawful behavior.
227. His request was denied in disregard of Agency policy and practice, and the CIA polygraph examiner, under direction of defendants, threatened Ciralsky with an immediate revocation of his security clearance which would have resulted in the loss of his employment with the CIA. Such a threat constituted unlawful intimidation since Agency polygraphers do not have the authority to revoke an employee's security clearance.
228. Despite the unlawfully coercive conduct of the CIA polygraphers, Ciralsky was ultimately accused of not being "cooperative" on account of his adamant refusal to falsely confess to wrongdoing. Moreover, Ciralsky's concerns about disparate, discriminatory and improper treatment were mocked and deemed indicative of "deception" on his part.
229. Defendants have consistently denied Ciralsky's’s requests pursuant to CIA regulations HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b to review his polygraph "results" and the audio and video recordings of his unlawfully coercive polygraph sessions, as well as reports and material derived from his polygraph testing.
230. After fraudulently inducing him to waive his Fifth Amendment rights for purposes of polygraph testing, defendants forced Ciralsky to choose between making a false confession of wrongdoing and being labeled uncooperative. Ciralsky opted for the latter.
231. The CIA's allegations against Ciralsky of an "initial failure to disclose" and a "lack of candor" are arbitrary and capricious as such "offenses" do not appear anywhere in CIA regulations and are not grounds for placing an employee on indefinite administrative leave, subjecting him to disciplinary proceedings and processes, or stripping him of his security clearance or his federal employment, as was done to Ciralsky.
232. By the foregoing, defendants, acting jointly and severally while within their respective official capacities as federal officials, interfered with, abridged and otherwise deprive Ciralsky of his property rights and liberty interests without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
233. Ciralsky has been injured by reason of the defendants' violations of his Fifth Amendment rights as noted immediately above, including by but not limited to the decimation of his government legal career, denial of salary and promotion, and by limiting his future promotional opportunities, and by foreclosing public and private sector employment opportunities.
234. Ciralsky has also suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, personal humiliation, resentment, loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, and other personal injuries as a result of the defendants' violations of his Fifth Amendment rights.
235. Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for any of the unconstitutional acts alleged hereinabove, for each of them knew, or had reason to know, that their behavior toward and with respect to plaintiff violated the rights guaranteed to plaintiff under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and CIA and FBI regulations. Therefore, defendants and each of them waived any qualified immunity that they may have had for performing discretionary functions which constitute the actions complained of herein. Moreover, no reasonable federal official in the position of these defendants could have believed that his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established laws, Executive Orders, regulations, and the laws arising from and interpretations of the Constitution.
236. For the foregoing reasons, individual-sued defendants are liable in their personal capacities, as well as in their official capacities, violating Ciralsky's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States while acting in their official capacities. Such defendants are therefore liable individually to Ciralsky for compensatory damages.
237. As the complained-of conduct of the individually-sued defendants was intentional and motivated by discriminatory and/or retaliatory intent and/or reckless or callous indifference to Ciralsky's Fifth Amendment rights, statutes, Executive Orders, and CIA and FBI regulations, such defendants are also liable to plaintiff for punitive damages.
CLAIM VI: Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution -- Name-Clearing Hearing
238. As a result of an improper and illegal CI and security investigation, the CIA insinuated that Ciralsky was an agent of a foreign power and/or he is disloyal to the United States, revoked Ciralsky's security clearance and terminated his employment. In addition, and in connection with the foregoing, the CIA disparaged Ciralsky's personal and professional reputation throughout the United States by leaking documents which are protected by the Privacy Act from disclosure and which are, in any event, replete with false information. The CIA's actions in this regard have had significant bearing on Ciralsky’s reputation and prospects for future employment opportunities in both the national security field and in the legal community.
239. The CIA never provided Ciralsky a fair and impartial hearing as an opportunity to clear his name and establish the truth or falsity of the above-noted allegations, nor did the CIA provide a basis for deciding whether its decisions based on those allegation were warranted. As a result, the CIA has effectively stigmatized Ciralsky with a negative reputation and imparted a "status change" upon him that has implicated and deprived him of an important liberty interests all without any due process.
240. As a result, Ciralsky has suffered and continues to suffer actual adverse and harmful effects, including but not limited to the denial of salary and promotion and the foreclosure of public and private sector employment opportunities.
241. Ciralsky has also suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, resentment, humiliation, and loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, as a result of the Defendants’ arbitrary, capricious and irrational conduct.
CLAIM VII: Violation of Title VII -- Race and Religious Discrimination
242. Ciralsky is Jewish. Jews are considered a distinct race and religion for purposes of Title VII.
243. At all relevant times, each of the defendants was aware of Ciralsky being Jewish.
244. Defendants' mistreatment of plaintiff as an employee of the CIA was motivated by the fact that Ciralsky is a Jew. As described in this Complaint, defendants' discriminatory actions included inter alia, (a) impeding Ciralsky's performance of his official duties as a CIA attorney; (b) subjecting him to legally unjustifiable "investigations", verbal abuse and harassment, custodial interrogations, "rigged" polygraph examinations, physical and electronic searches, and disciplinary proceedings; (c) placing him on indefinite administrative leave; (d) placing him on LWOP; (e) stripping him of his security clearance; (f) firing him from his CIA position; (g) threatening him and otherwise violating his constitutional rights; (h) frustrating, indeed, obstructing Ciralsky's efforts to timely invoke and/or exhaust the adminstrative EEO complaint process under 29 C.F.R. Part 1614.
245. Indeed, defendants' actions toward and with regard to plaintiff were motivated by racial and religious animus against Jews. As such, all such mistreatment of plaintiff constitutes unlawful discrimination against him on the basis his being of the Jewish race and/or his practicing the Jewish faith, all of which is in violation of Title VII prohibition against race discrimination and/or religious discrimination in employment practices.
246. As a result of defendants' unlawful race and religious discrimination against him, Ciralsky has suffered and continues to suffer actual adverse and harmful effects and injuries, including but not limited lost pay, lost promotions and future promotional opportunities, and foreclosure of public and private sector employment opportunities. Further, plaintiff has also suffered injury and damage in the form of anger, anxiety, emotional distress, resentment, humiliation, and loss of reputation and professional and personal standing as a result of defendants' unlawful race and religious discrimination against him.
247. Thus, defendant Tenet, in his official capacity as the head of the CIA, is libel to Ciralsky under Title VII for the unlawful employment discrimination perpetrated by defendants against plaintiff.
CLAIM VIII: Violation of Title VII -- Retaliation and Reprisal
248. Defendants mistreatment of plaintiff as an employee of the CIA as described in this Complaint increased in frequency following Ciralsky's written and verbal complaints to CIA management about disparate and discriminatory treatment he was receiving because he is a Jew.
249. Moreover, it was after Ciralsky complained about discrimination on the job to CIA management that the Agency began its campaign of verbal abuse and harassment of plaintiff, instituted phony disciplinary proceedings against him, and placed him on indefinite administrative leave and then on LWOP, stripped him of his security clearance, and ultimately, fired him from his job while threatening his legal career.
250. In increasing the abuse heaped upon Ciralsky and in taking the ultimate job-ending and career threatening actions against him, defendants acted in retaliation against him because of his complaints of and opposition to the unlawful race and religious discrimination being perpetrated against him at the Agency. In so doing, defendants separately violated Title VII by engaging in reprisal against plaintiff for his having engaged in protected civil rights activity.
251. As a result of defendants' unlawful retaliation and reprisal against plaintiff for his having complained about and opposed race and religious discrimination against him on the job, Ciralsky has suffered and continues to suffer actual adverse and harmful effects and injuries, including but not limited lost pay, lost promotions and future promotional opportunities, and foreclosure of public and private sector employment opportunities. Further, plaintiff has also suffered injury and damage in the form of anger, anxiety, emotional distress, resentment, humiliation, and loss of reputation and professional and personal standing as a result of defendants' unlawful retaliation and reprisal against him for his protected civil rights activity.
252. Thus, defendant Tenet, in his official capacity as the head of the CIA, is libel to Ciralsky under Title VII for the unlawful retaliation and reprisal perpetrated by defendants against plaintiff.
CLAIM IX: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Improper Disclosure
253. Section (b) of the Privacy Act provides that an agency may not disclose records about an individual except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the subject unless the disclosure itself falls within the limited exceptions (to the general rule of non-disclosure) set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 1901.31. A disclosure need not be public to be unlawful; an "intra-agency" disclosure may also violate the Privacy Act where the disclosure is made to officers or employees who have no need for the record in the performance of their official duties.
254. CIA officials repeatedly violated Section (b) of the Privacy Act by disclosing Ciralsky's records without his consent. These improper disclosures did not fall within any of the exemptions set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 1901.31.
255. CIA officials illegally disclosed the contents of Ciralsky's security and CI files to other government officials who were neither responsible for nor in any way involved with the handling of Ciralsky'’s case within the CIA.
256. Furthermore, without first obtaining a Privacy Act waiver, defendants shared the inaccurate, incomplete and unlawfully-maintained contents of Ciralsky's security and CI files with at least five (5) private citizens. As these disclosures did not fall within the limited exceptions (to the general rule of non-disclosure) set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) and 32 C.F.R. § 1901.31, they too were unlawful under the Privacy Act.
257. These unlawful disclosures were part of an effort by the defendants to persuade purportedly disinterested private citizens that the CIA has not engaged in a pattern and practice of anti-Semitic conduct. In this effort, defendants even went so far as to dispatch the aforementioned private citizens to New York in what was ultimately an unsuccessful bid to dissuade American Jewish leaders from supporting -- and countenancing the claims made by -- Ciralsky and other similarly-situated Jewish-Americans.
258. In discussions with the CIA, these private citizens alluded to the inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant, untimely and unlawfully-maintained contents of Ciralsky's security and CI files disclosed to them by defendants. Thus, the CIA's unlawful disclosure of Ciralsky's records to five or more private citizens, led to an even wider and equally unlawful dissemination of Privacy Act material.
259. CIA officials again illegally disclosed the inaccurate, incomplete and unlawfully-maintained contents of Ciralsky's security and CI files when they provided an "Eyes Only" MFR entitled "Adam Jon Ciralsky - Revocation of Security Clearances" to the Washington Post and the CBS News program 60 Minutes. This MFR is replete with factual inaccuracies and material misstatements about and concerning plaintiff.
260. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known that their actions with regard to the disclosures of documents and information concerning plaintiff (as described immediately above) were improper and unlawful and in violation of the Privacy Act.
261. In making the disclosures (described immediately above) the CIA, and its employees and officers, acted intentionally and willfully in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
262. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM X: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Maintenance of Irrelevant and Unnecessary Information
263. Section (e)(1) of the Privacy Act requires that federal agencies maintain in their records "only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President."
264. While CI and personnel security (or screening) are indeed part of the CIA's mission, Executive Order 12968 (1995) makes plain that racial and religious considerations are not relevant to that mission. Thus, in attempting to ascertain whether a current or prospective employee is a CI or security risk, Agency officials are not permitted to consider an individual's race or religion at all, much less as determinative evidence on the matter.
265. In sworn statements to courts and Congress, and in press releases attendant thereto, CIA officials routinely profess to understand and abide by the prohibitions on considering race and religion noted in above. They claim that the Agency is an "equal opportunity employer" that does "not tolerate discrimination of any kind." Following settlement of a sex discrimination class action suit in 1995, then-DCI John Deutch promised to hold CIA employees "accountable for their actions in achieving the objective of a bias-free workplace."
266. However, the CIA has repeatedly violated Section (e)(1) of the Privacy Act by creating, maintaining and disseminating records which contain information about, and make disparaging references to, Ciralsky's race and religion, information which the President, the Congress and the courts have determined is irrelevant and unnecessary to accomplish the Agency's national security mission.
267. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known that their actions in creating, maintaining and disseminating records which contain information about, and make disparaging references to, Ciralsky's race and religion, were improper, unlawful and/or in violation of the Privacy Act.
268. In creating, maintaining and disseminating records which contain information about, and make disparaging references to, Ciralsky's race and religion, the CIA, its employees and officers, acted intentionally or willfully in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
269. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XI: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Failure to Publish Notice of System of Records
270. Section (e)(4) of the Privacy Act requires that federal agencies publish in the Federal Register (upon establishment or revision) a notice of the existence and character of the various systems of records they maintain.
271. CIA officials and FBI officials assigned to the CIA deliberately and unlawfully maintained records concerning Ciralsky outside of official U.S. Government record-keeping systems, in violation of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) rules, CIA and FBI policies and procedures and Section (e)(4) of the Privacy Act.
272. Whether this was done to thwart judicial and congressional investigation and oversight -- by ensuring that unlawful and anti-Semitic material would not be discovered through conventional search methods -- or to stem the legal exposure of Agency officials, it was also clearly calculated to frustrate Ciralsky's requests for documents under the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act. These document requests have been languishing at the FBI, since January 22, 1998, and at the CIA, since July 17, 1998, without response.
273. One of the documents released by the CIA to Ciralsky's counsel, entitled "Spot Report - Next Steps in the Adam Ciralsky Case", actually contains written instructions that the document not be entered into Federal Record-Keeping systems. Moreover, this document bears no identifying number and would likely not be retrievable in response to a Privacy Act or FOIA (or a discovery) request.
274. A February 24, 1998 e-mail memorandum released by the CIA to Ciralsky'’s counsel reveals that CIC/CEG "renamed many of the files in the [Ciralsky] directory." Upon information and belief, this action was taken to ensure both that documents related to Ciralsky would not be discovered through conventional search methods and to frustrate Ciralsky's Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act requests.
275. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known that their actions in maintaining records concerning Ciralsky outside of official U.S. Government record-keeping systems was improper, unlawful and/or in violation of National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) rules, CIA and FBI policies and procedures and Section (e)(4) of the Privacy Act.
276. In maintaining records concerning Ciralsky outside of official U.S. Government record-keeping systems, the CIA, its employees and officers, acted intentionally or willfully in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
277. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XII: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Failure to Maintain Accurate, Relevant, Timely and Complete Records
278. Section (e)(5) of the Privacy Act requires that federal agencies "maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination."
279. CIA officials willfully and intentionally created and maintained inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant and untimely records concerning Ciralsky. By the Agency's own admission, these records formed the basis for the adverse personnel decision taken against plaintiff by the so-called ERP.
280. Moreover, in the months preceding the ERP, the CIA adamantly refused Ciralsky's and his counsel's repeated written and oral requests for copies of, or access to, plaintiff's records. Agency officials claimed that it was "against CIA policy" to permit employees -- whose careers and reputations rest on the outcome of ERPs -- to review, much less correct, the records upon which ERPs base their decisions.
281. It was not until July 7, 1998 that the CIA, after first informing Ciralsky of the ERP's adverse decision (rendered in secret in November of 1997), released selective and heavily redacted portions of the records which Ciralsky and his attorney had actively sought since at least October of 1997 and upon which the ERP decision purportedly rested.
282. CIA officials intentionally delayed the release of portions of Ciralsky's’s long-sought records until July of 1998 when, of course, the ERP decision of November 1997 had long since become a fait accompli. By their own actions and admissions, therefore, CIA officials intentionally and willfully made no effort to ascertain whether the information maintained (unlawfully) in Ciralsky's records was accurate, complete, relevant or timely. In fact, defendants deliberately played a ten-month shell game with Ciralsky's records so as to ensure that their inaccuracies and anti-Semitic language would not be brought to light.
283. While CIA officials represented in July of 1998 that Ciralsky's records were redacted and released (albeit selectively) in accordance with FOIA and Privacy Act standards, in fact they were not. Rather, among other things the CIA failed to number the released pages so that Ciralsky and his counsel could ascertain the number of documents being withheld.
284. Furthermore, CIA officials ran afoul of both the Privacy Act and Executive Order 12958 by classifying information in an attempt to conceal violations of law and inefficiency and administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to CIA officials and the CIA as a whole, and to delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
285. Agency officials likewise created records which deliberately and maliciously misquote Ciralsky. This is all the more egregious -- and cannot be seen as mere administrative error -- considering that Ciralsky's actual statements, though incorrectly punctuated, were preserved in their entirety in other CIA records.
286. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known that their actions in creating and maintaining inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant and untimely records concerning Ciralsky was improper, unlawful and/or in violation of Section (e)(5) of the Privacy Act.
287. In creating and maintaining inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant and untimely records concerning Ciralsky, the CIA, its employees and officers, acted intentionally or willfully in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
288. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XIII: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Dissemination of Inaccurate, Irrelevant, Untimely and Incomplete Records
289. Section (e)(6) of the Privacy Act requires that agencies "prior to disseminating any record about an individual to any person other than an agency, unless the dissemination is made pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this section, make reasonable efforts to assure that such records are accurate, complete, timely, and relevant for agency purposes."
290. Defendants violated Section (e)(6) of the Privacy Act by refusing to make any effort -- much less a "reasonable" effort -- to assure that records concerning Ciralsky were accurate, complete, timely, and relevant for Agency purposes prior to their release.
291. In fact, CIA officials willfully and intentionally disseminated inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant and untimely records concerning Ciralsky. By the Agency's own admission, these records formed the basis for the adverse personnel decision taken against Ciralsky by the so-called ERP.
292. Moreover, in the months preceding the ERP, the CIA adamantly refused Ciralsky's repeated written and oral requests for copies of or access to Ciralsky'’s records. Agency officials claimed that it was "against CIA policy" to permit employees -- whose careers and reputations rest on the outcome of ERPs -- to review or correct the records upon which ERPs base their decisions.
293. It was not until July 7, 1998 that the CIA, after first informing Ciralsky of the ERP's adverse decision (rendered in secret in November of 1997), released selective and heavily redacted portions of the records which Ciralsky and his attorney had actively sought since at least October of 1997 and upon which the ERP decision rested.
294. CIA officials intentionally delayed the release of (portions of) Ciralsky's long-sought records until July of 1998 by which time the ERP decision of November of 1997 had long since become a fait accompli. By their own actions and admissions, therefore, CIA officials intentionally and willfully impeded Ciralsky's efforts to ensure that the information maintained in the Agency's records concerning him was accurate, complete, relevant or timely.
295. In fact, defendants deliberately played a ten month long shell game with the records pertaining to Ciralsky so as to ensure that their inaccuracies and anti-Semitic language would not be brought to light.
296. Although in July of 1998 CIA officials represented that Agency records regarding Ciralsky were redacted and released (albeit selectively) in accordance with FOIA and Privacy Act standards, in fact they were not. Rather, in addition to other failings concerning the release of these records, the CIA failed to number the released pages so that Ciralsky and his counsel could ascertain the number of documents being withheld from release.
297. Furthermore, CIA officials ran afoul of both the Privacy Act and Executive Order 12958 by classifying information in an attempt to conceal violations of law, and/or inefficiency and/or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to CIA officials and the CIA as a whole, and to delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
298. In addition, Agency officials created records which deliberately and maliciously misquote Ciralsky. This is all the more egregious -- and can hardly be considered administrative error -- as Ciralsky's actual statements, which CIA officials creatively shortened to alter their meaning, were preserved in their entirety in other CIA records.
299. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known that their actions in intentionally disseminated inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant and untimely records concerning Ciralsky -- rather than assuring such records, properly disseminated, are accurate, complete, relevant and timely -- was improper, unlawful and/or in violation of Section (e)(6) of the Privacy Act.
300. In intentionally disseminated inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant and untimely records concerning Ciralsky, the CIA, its employees and officers, acted intentionally or willfully in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
301. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XIV: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Maintenance of First Amendment Records
302. Section (e)(7) of the Privacy Act prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records which describe "how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity."
303. Courts have held that statutes which otherwise confer discretion on federal agencies to evaluate an individual's fitness for employment or a security clearance, should not be read to permit "wholesale maintenance of all materials relating to political beliefs, association, and religion."
304. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the CIA shall have no "police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security function." The CIA not only acknowledges, but highlights this prohibition -- against maintaining "law enforcement" records -- on its Freedom of Information Act / Privacy Act website.
305. Ciralsky has never consented to the creation or retention by the CIA or FBI of records which describe how he exercises his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, under the Privacy Act, the CIA may not maintain records which describe how Ciralsky exercises his First Amendment rights.
306. The CIA, however, has repeatedly violated Section (e)(7) of the Privacy Act by creating, maintaining and disseminating records which describe (indeed, mock) how Ciralsky, his family and other "rich Jewish friends" exercise their rights under the First Amendment.
307. Specifically, CIA officials created and disseminated records which discuss and purport to analyze Ciralsky's Jewish religious beliefs and practices and religious and ethnic associations. In language that is as paranoid as it is anti-Semitic, CIA records:
a. describe Ciralsky as a "rich Jewish" employee of the Agency with a "wealthy daddy";
b. detail and cast aspersions upon Ciralsky's and his family's monetary support for the UJA and Israel Bonds -- activity which, according to Agency officials, "paints him and his family as extreme supporters of Israel's hard liners in the Likud party";
c. compare Ciralsky to other "hard-line" Jews at the CIA who "think in terms of 'us' versus 'them'";
d. accuse Ciralsky of "withholding" information from the CIA about the aforementioned First Amendment activity because, again according to Agency officials, "he wishes to avoid being seen such a lover of Israel [sic]";
e. refer to Ciralsky's exercise of his First Amendment rights as "pro-Israeli baggage" and a "CI issue" deserving of special treatment; and
f. reveal that CI and security officials monitor the activities of and conversations among Jewish employees at the CIA.
308. The Agency's illicit creation and retention of records describing how Ciralsky and other "rich", "hard-line" Jews exercise their First Amendment rights was not an isolated transgression of the Privacy Act.
309. Records released by the CIA to date contain unlawful, irrelevant, inaccurate and pejorative references to the exercise of First Amendment rights by Ciralsky, his family and his "rich Jewish friends."
310. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known that their maintenance of First Amendment records concerning Ciralsky was improper, unlawful and/or in violation of Section (e)(7) of the Privacy Act.
311. In intentionally maintaining First Amendment records concerning Ciralsky, the CIA, its employees and officers, acted intentionally or willfully in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
312. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XV: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Lack of Supervision
313. The CIA failed to maintain certain records concerning Ciralsky covered by the Privacy Act within specific record systems, failed to maintain accurate or complete accountings of certain disclosures with respect to each system of records under its control, and improperly disclosed protected information concerning Ciralsky.
314. The CIA has failed to instruct its officers and employees about the proper operation and maintenance of the systems of records containing Ciralsky’s records, the rules and requirements of the Privacy Act, and the penalties for noncompliance in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9).
315. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known about the proper operation and maintenance of the systems of records containing Ciralsky’s records, the rules and requirements of the Privacy Act, and the penalties for noncompliance in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9).
316. In failing to properly supervise its officers and employees regarding the proper operation and maintenance of the systems of records containing Ciralsky’s records, the rules and requirements of the Privacy Act, and the penalties for noncompliance in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9), the CIA acted in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
317. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XVI: Violation of the Privacy Act -- Lack of Safeguards
318. The CIA's actions in improperly disclosing Ciralsky's records were also a flagrant violation of Section (e)(10) of the Privacy Act and suggest that the CIA either has not established or refuses to abide by the requirement of that section of the Act that demands agencies create and maintain "appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information is maintained."
319. The CIA, its employees and officers, knew or should have known about the requirement of creating and maintaining proper safeguards pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10).
320. In failing to established and/or refusing to abide by the requirement of Section (e)(10) of the Privacy Act, the CIA acted in derogation of Ciralsky's privacy rights and in violation of the Privacy Act.
321. As a result of the CIA's above-noted violations of the Privacy Act, Ciralsky has suffered adverse and harmful effects and injury, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.
CLAIM XVII: Violation of the Privacy Act and the FOIA - With-holding of Records by the CIA
322. By letter dated July 17, 1998, Ciralsky filed a FOIA and Privacy Act requests for all records pertaining to himself, members of his immediate family, and on various topics related to the CIA's activities involving the Jewish community. Ciralsky provided all necessary privacy waivers and requested expedited treatment of his requests.
323. By letter dated September 9, 1998, the CIA acknowledged Ciralsky's FOIA and Privacy Act requests and assigned those aspects pertaining specifically to him reference number P-1998-01257.
324. Notwithstanding the fact that the CIA documents described in Ciralsky's request had long since been collated and segregated at the CIA, Agency officials cited a backlog of requests as the reason the CIA could not meet its ten-day statutory response deadline. The CIA denied Ciralsky's request for expedited processing.
325. By letter dated October 30, 1998, the CIA assigned reference number F-1998-01663 to the remaining portions of Ciralsky's FOIA request.
326. The CIA refused to process Ciralsky's requests for information concerning his family members based on an alleged failure to provide their nationalities and citizenship status. However, this information was not only not required for the CIA to process Ciralsky's requests, it was already in the CIA's possession. The CIA, again, denied Ciralsky's request for expedited treatment.
327. By letter dated November 12, 1998, Ciralsky provided the CIA with the requested information concerning his family members. Additionally, he requested from the CIA a "full and complete 'accounting' of all disclosures by the CIA of records described in my requests."
328. By letter dated January 6, 1999, Ciralsky appealed the CIA's failure to abide by the statutory response periods pertaining to his FOIA and Privacy Act requests.
329. By letter dated April 13, 1999, the CIA accepted Ciralsky's appeal of his FOIA and Privacy Act requests and assigned the appeal reference number P-1998-01257.
330. By letter dated April 13, 1999, the CIA accepted Ciralsky'’s appeal of his FOIA requests and assigned it reference number F-1998-01663.
331. By letter dated September 9, 1999, Ciralsky updated and supplemented his Privacy Act request (P-1998-01257) and Freedom of Information Act request (F-1998-01663) to ensure that when the CIA responds substantively, the responses will cover all pertinent records created up to the date of receipt of that letter (i.e., September 9, 1999).
332. No substantive responses to the above-referenced FOIA and Privacy Act requests have been received from the CIA.
333. Upon information and belief, the CIA has instructed its FOIA/Privacy Act division to frustrate and subvert Ciralsky's requests.
334. Ciralsky has exhausted all required administrative remedies with regard to the above-mentioned FOIA and Privacy Act requests.
335. Ciralsky has a legal right under FOIA and the Privacy Act to obtain the information he seeks, and there is no legal basis for the CIA frustrating the satisfaction of this legal right. In frustrating the satisfaction of plaintiff's legal right to disclosure of the information sought, the CIA is in violation of both the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
CLAIM XVIII: Violation of the Privacy Act and the FOIA - Withholding of Records by the FBI
336. By letter dated January 22, 1998, Ciralsky filed a request for expedited treatment under the FOIA and Privacy Acts for all FBI records (including those maintained by FBI Headquarters and by the FBI's Washington Field Office) pertaining to himself.
337. By letter dated February 18, 1998, the FBI acknowledged Ciralsky's Privacy Act request and assigned it request number 432449.
338. By letter dated January 6, 1999, Ciralsky appealed the FBI's failure to abide by the statutory response period with regard to his Privacy Act request (432449) -- which was -- in effect, a refusal to disclose requested documents. Additionally, Ciralsky submitted a FOIA request for certain records pertaining to the monitoring of Jewish Americans in government and the private sector.
339. By letter dated February 5, 1999, the FBI acknowledged Ciralsky's FOIA request and assigned it request number 444187.
340. By letter dated February 17, 1999, the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") Office of Information and Privacy refused Ciralsky's request for expedited processing (of his FOIA and Privacy Act requests) citing "the fact" that Ciralsky is "currently involved in litigation for which the requested material may be pertinent." This was patently untrue. In fact, Ciralsky did not file the instant action until long after the DOJ cited "litigation" as the basis for its refusal to expedite processing.
341. By letter dated June 30, 1999, the FBI provided a "no records" response to Ciralsky's FOIA requests (444187 and 444188) in which he sought information about Operation Scope, Operation Gold and other FBI efforts to monitor Jewish Americans. Ciralsky appealed the FBI's "no records" response in a letter dated July 19, 1999.
342. In a second letter, also dated June 30, 1999, the FBI invoked an FOIA exemption from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1) and withheld all documents responsive to Ciralsky's Privacy Act request (432449). Moreover, the FBI claimed that "a search of the FBIHQ electronic surveillance indices was conducted and no responsive record was located which indicates that [Ciralsky] ha[s] ever been the target of an electronic surveillance."
343. Ciralsky appealed the FBI's complete denial of his Privacy Act request (432449) in a letter dated July 19, 1999.
344. In its June 30, 1999 letter, the FBI also claimed that Ciralsky's requests for information on U.S. Government efforts to monitor Jewish government employees was "too vague", that Ciralsky's requests for information on U.S. Government CI or personnel security efforts targeting Jewish government employees was likewise "too vague", that "no records" exist concerning Operation Scope or Operation Gold or any other effort to monitor Jewish-Americans and that "no such programs [which monitor the activities of Jews or Israeli sympathizers in the United States] exist".
345. The FBI's denial regarding programs to monitor the activities of Jews or Israeli sympathizers in the United States (i.e., that "no such programs exist") was limited to the present tense and was, therefore, non-responsive to Ciralsky's request regarding records of programs of this kind whenever they may have existed.
346. In any event, in a letter dated July 19, 1999, Ciralsky appealed the FBI's responses to his FOIA requests (444187 and 444188) -- i.e. "too vague" and "no records" and "no such programs."
347. By letter dated August 5, 1999, the DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy (DOJ/OIP) acknowledged Ciralsky's appeals and assigned them the numbers 99-4134 (for Ciralsky's Privacy Act request 432449) and 99-4135 (for Ciralsky's FOIA requests 444187 and 444188).
348. By letter dated September 20, 1999, the DOJ/OIP affirmed on appeal (99-4135) the FBI’s "no records" response to Ciralsky’s FOIA requests 444187 and 444188.
349. By letter dated September 23, 1999, the DOJ/OIP, after first acknowledging that Ciralsky is the subject of "one FBI Headquarters main file," affirmed on appeal (99-4134) the FBI's complete denial of all records related to Ciralsky on the grounds that every portion of every record is classified and therefore exempt from disclosure. In other words, the DOJ/OIP took an exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1).
350. Ciralsky has exhausted all required administrative remedies with respect to the above-mentioned FOIA and Privacy Act requests to the FBI.
351. Ciralsky has a legal right under the FOIA and the Privacy Act to obtain to obtain the information he seeks, and there is no legal basis for the FBI frustrating the satisfaction of this legal right. In frustrating the satisfaction of plaintiff's legal right to disclosure of the information sought, the FBI is in violation of both the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
CLAIM XIX -- Breach of Contract
352. The CIA's employment agreement with Ciralsky required the Agency to pay Ciralsky at the rate of pay of a federal Civil Service employee at the GS-11, step 1 level -- i.e., $37,094 per annum. While the Government could extend the term of the contract, it could not extend it without also paying Ciralsky the agreed upon salary.
353. The CIA on two separate occasions extended Ciralsky's employment contract after its initial expiration. However, the Agency refused to pay Ciralsky the agreed upon salary from March 1, 1999 until December 13, 1999, thereby breaching its contract obligation to him.
354. During this period when the Agency unilaterally and indefinitely extended Ciralsky's employment contract without pay (it placed him involuntarily in LWOP status), Ciralsky could not obtain outside employment without the CIA's consent, travel outside the United States without notifying the Agency in advance, or publish anything without the CIA's consent.
355. As a result of the Agency's breaches of its employment contract with Ciralsky, plaintiff suffered damages in the form of extreme financial hardship.
CLAIM XX: Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights - 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986
356. Ciralsky is Jewish. Jews are considered a distinct race and religion for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.
357. At all relevant times, each of the Defendants was aware of Ciralsky’s religion.
358. The Defendants, acting under color of law, custom and usage, and by way of a conspiracy among them, impeded Ciralsky’s performance of his official duties as a CIA attorney and an officer of the court by subjecting him to, inter alia, legally unjustified and discriminatory "investigations", verbal abuse and harassment, unlawful custodial interrogations, ‘rigged’ polygraph examinations, illegal searches, phony disciplinary proceedings, and ultimately by placing him on indefinite administrative leave and stripping him of his security clearance and his CIA position, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1).
359. The Defendants’ actions were motivated by racial and religious animus and increased in frequency following, and in retaliation for, Ciralsky’s written and verbal complaints to CIA management about disparate, discriminatory and unlawful treatment.
360. Moreover, the Defendants harassed and intimidated Ciralsky and reinstated phony disciplinary proceedings against him after Ciralsky’s counsel reported significant evidence of the Defendants’ criminal conduct to the Attorney General of the United States. Ciralsky has an ongoing obligation both as a CIA employee (pursuant to Executive Order 12333) and as an officer of the court to report such criminal activity to the Department of Justice.
361. The Defendants, acting under color of law, custom and usage, and by way of a conspiracy among them, impeded, hindered and obstructed the due course of justice with the intent to deny Ciralsky equal protection of the laws and to injure him in his property for lawfully attempting to enforce his right to equal protection of the laws, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
362. The Defendants’ actions in this regard included, but were not limited to, falsifying, fabricating and, upon information and belief, destroying federal records, unlawfully keeping files and documents related to Ciralsky out of government record-keeping systems so as to thwart discovery requests by Congress and the courts and FOI/PA requests by Ciralsky, impeding Ciralsky’s efforts to proceed through the EEO process (in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1614 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and threatening, among other things, to "ruin" Ciralsky and to seek the revocation of his bar licenses if he attempted to enforce his rights by filing the instant Complaint.
363. Moreover, the Defendants impeded, hindered and obstructed the due course of justice by repeatedly threatening Ciralsky and retaliating against him after Ciralsky’s counsel reported significant evidence of the Defendants’ criminal conduct to the Attorney General of the United States. Ciralsky has an ongoing obligation both as a CIA employee (pursuant to Executive Order 12333) and an officer of the court to report criminal activity to the Department of Justice.
364. The Defendants, acting under color of law, custom and usage, and by way of a conspiracy among them, have caused Ciralsky to be denied equal protection of the laws and to be deprived of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, on account of Ciralsky’s religion and race, by subjecting him to, inter alia, legally unjustified, and inherently discriminatory "investigations", verbal abuse and harassment, unlawful custodial interrogations, ‘rigged’ polygraph examinations, illegal searches, and phony disciplinary proceedings, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
365. The supervisory Defendants had knowledge of the conspiracy to violate Ciralsky’s civil rights and of the violations committed, and had power to prevent these wrongs, but neglected or refused to do so, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
366. The Defendants' acts were done in knowing violation of Ciralsky’s legal and constitutional rights, and have directly and proximately caused Ciralsky anger, anxiety, emotional distress, humiliation, resentment, loss of reputation and professional and personal standing, and other personal injuries.
367. Ciralsky’s injuries as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful and discriminatory actions have included the decimation of his government and legal career, denial of salary and promotion, foreclosure of public and private sector employment opportunities, expenses for legal fees and other costs, and other compensatory damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Ciralsky prays that this honorable Court grant him the following relief:
a. Declare that defendants violated Ciralsky's rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
b. Declare that the rights of Jewish Americans throughout the national security establishment have been violated by the defendants' use of a CI profile, program, policy and practice which subjects Jews to disparate, discriminatory, improper and unlawful security and CI scrutiny and treatment on account of their religious beliefs and practices and their ethnic and religious associations and activities;
c. Declare that the following acts of defendants were done in violation of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States:
1. incorporating considerations of race, religion and ethnicity in investigating Ciralsky and in revoking his access to classified information;
2. subjecting Ciralsky to disparate and improper security and CI scrutiny and treatment based upon his and/or his family's constitutionally-protected ethnic and religious associations -- associations which, in addition to having been fully known to and countenanced by the CIA when it hired Ciralsky and later when it granted him TOP SECRET/SCI access, did not violate the CIA's standards and regulations regarding unauthorized foreign contact;
3. knowingly deceiving Ciralsky (and his attorney) in person and in writing with regard to the genesis of the CIA/FBI "investigation" of him so as to secure his involuntary cooperation in an unlawful and patently discriminatory enterprise, fraudulently inducing him to waive his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, denying him the opportunity to know and hence rebut the "charges" against him, and denying him the opportunity to clear his good name and reputation;
4. retaliating against Ciralsky after he complained to CIA officials about the anti-Semitic tenor, focus, scope and conduct of the security and CI "processing" of and disciplinary processes against him;
5. subjecting Ciralsky to multiple coercive and unlawful polygraph examinations and counterespionage interrogations in which the polygraphers and investigators consistently ignored his favorable polygraph results and background investigations as well as other central evidence and facts in an attempt to match him with the CIA's and FBI's unlawful and anti-Semitic CI profile;
6. threatening Ciralsky that his situation could be resolved favorably only if he were to confess either that his friends and acquaintances (including a college Hebrew teacher and a chaperon on his high school trips to Israel) were Israeli spies or "sleeper" agents or that he himself was an Israeli spy or "sleeper" agent -- all of which are outrageous, slanderous and totally unfounded charges that the CIA and FBI knew full well could not be substantiated;
7. retaliating against Ciralsky and accusing him of a "lack of candor" after he resisted the improper and unlawful efforts to extract a false confession of wrongdoing or impropriety regarding his and his family's and religious beliefs and practices and his ethnic and religious associations and activities;
8. subjecting Ciralsky to electronic surveillance and non-consensual physical searches at home and at work on the basis of activities which were lawful and protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Executive Order 12968 and 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.;
9. initiating a disciplinary process to re-consider Ciralsky's eligibility for TOP SECRET/SCI access based upon his and his family's religious beliefs and practices and their religious and ethnic associations and activities in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Executive Order 12968, and Title VII;
10. empaneling an ERP in November 1997 -- an ex parte body in which investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are commingled and in which its participants, decision-makers and deliberations remain secret and anonymous, thereby denying Ciralsky the rights to notice and a hearing, to be informed of the nature and basis of the "accusation" against him, to confront the "evidence" against him, and to an impartial trier of fact;
11. empaneling a second ERP in March 1998 with no procedural safeguards and, in the interim, re-investigating Ciralsky and his family in a futile attempt to uncover any "evidence" which might justify an administrative finding against him;
12. deliberately deceiving and misleading Ciralsky as to the genesis for the Agency's administrative, CI and security efforts against him and attributing those efforts to "information" about him received from a third agency while refusing to disclose either the identity of the third agency or the nature or substance of the "information";
13. relying on secret, unverified evidence both at the ERPs and in the July 1998 decision to revoke Ciralsky's security clearance and dismiss him from the CIA;
14. predetermining and manipulating the "results" of Ciralsky's polygraph examinations;
15. threatening Ciralsky's personal safety while in a foreign country;
16. threatening to misuse the FBI to defame Ciralsky;
17. convening disciplinary panels in November 1997 and March 1998 to rubber stamp an adverse personnel decision to terminate Ciralsky made by defendant Tenet on or before September 19, 1997;
18. retaliating against Ciralsky after he reported defendants unlawful conduct to the Attorney General of the United States;
d. Declare that the CIA's ERP process is unconstitutional, and direct defendant Tenet and all persons acting on his behalf to immediately act to dismantle and counteract the CIA's ERP processes convened against Ciralsky.
e. Declare that the CIA violated Title VII by discriminating against plaintiff in employment practices based on his race (Jewish), including by firing plaintiff from its employment, by withholding his promotion, by revoking his security clearance, and by mistreating him and abusing him on the job through misuse of the security clearance and CI processes.
f. Declare that the CIA violated Title VII by discriminating against plaintiff in employment practices based on his religion (Jewish), including by firing plaintiff from its employment, by withholding his promotion, by revoking his security clearance, and by mistreating him and abusing him on the job through misuse of the security clearance and CI processes.
g. Declare that the CIA violated Title VII by retaliating against plaintiff for his having complained about and opposed discrimination against him based on race and religion, including by firing plaintiff from its employment, by withholding his promotion, by revoking his security clearance, by mistreating him and abusing him on the job through misuse of the security clearance and CI processes, and by threatening him with destruction of his legal career.
h. Declare that defendants have each violated the following statutes, regulations and Executive Orders:
1. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq.;
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552;
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a;
4. 5 U.S.C. § 706;
5. Executive Order 12333;
6. Executive Order 12958;
7. Executive Order 12968;
8. HR 10-15 and AR 10-15-18 -- the CIA's foreign contact reporting regulations;
9. HHB 70-1 and HR 10-8b -- the CIA's regulations providing employees access to, inter alia, their security and polygraph files and records;
10. Polygraph Policies, Procedures, and Standards in the Central Intelligence Agency (pursuant to HR 10-3);
11. AR 10-3 (directing that Polygraph Policies, Procedures, and Standards in the Central Intelligence Agency be provided upon request to any employee required to take a polygraph);
12. DCID 1/14; and
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.
i. Enjoin defendant Tenet, his successors, and any persons acting on his or their behalf, from all administrative proceedings and processes against Ciralsky, and direct them to:
1. set aside any and all findings or recommendations made by the ERPs and boards of appeal regarding plaintiff;
2. remove from Ciralsky's personnel, security, and CI files all references to and conclusions drawn from the CIA's administrative, security, and CI efforts against him; and
3. remove from Ciralsky's personnel, security, and CI files any and all references to his religion and his religious beliefs and practices and his religious and ethnic associations and activities, as well as those of his family;
j. Enjoining defendants Tenet and Freeh, their successors, and all persons acting on their behalf, from taking any steps to remove, revoke, limit or otherwise jeopardize Ciralsky's security clearance on account of his being Jewish or practicing the Jewish faith or engaging in religious or ethnic associations or activities;
k. Enjoining defendants Tenet and Freeh, their successors, and all persons acting on their behalf, from denying or revoking security clearances, career opportunities and advancement to Jewish Americans on account of their ethnic and religious beliefs, practices, associations or activities;
l. Direct defendant Freeh, his successors, and all persons acting on their behalf to expunge from files of the FBI related to Ciralsky all inaccurate and unverified information about him;
m. Direct defendant Tenet, his successors, and all persons acting on their behalf to permit Ciralsky and his attorneys immediate and unfettered access to his unredacted security, CI and polygraph files;
n. Direct defendants Freeh and Tenet, their successors and all persons acting on their behalf, to permit Ciralsky and his attorneys immediate and unfettered access to "information" and files at the CIA and FBI which in any way relate to CI and security actions undertaken against him;
o. Enjoin the CIA and FBI from withholding Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act records sought by Ciralsky and ordering the production to Ciralsky and his counsel of those CIA and FBI records responsive to his requests.
p. Enjoining all defendants, and their successors in federal offices, and all persons acting on their behalf, from:
1. further actions in violation of Ciralsky's rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
2. further actions against Ciralsky in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 552, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and 5 U.S.C. § 706; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986;
3. further actions against Ciralsky in violation of CIA and FBI regulations; and
4. disparaging, denigrating or otherwise impugning the character, loyalty or integrity of Ciralsky and other loyal Jewish Americans.
q. Declare that the CIA's polygraph program is unconstitutional as applied to Ciralsky and others insofar as:
1. polygraph "results" and outcomes are predetermined and manipulated by Agency officials;
2. employees like Ciralsky are routinely forced by security and CI officials to submit to polygraph examination under threat of losing their livelihood;
3. "non-deceptive" or "favorable" polygraph results are manipulated and/or ignored entirely by Agency officials;
4. employees are coerced and fraudulently induced into waiving their Fifth Amendment rights for purposes of polygraph testing;
5. Agency officials rely on unfavorable or artificial polygraph results in making adverse personnel decisions but refuse employees like Ciralsky the opportunity to introduce results in their favor;
6. employees are forced to choose between making a confession of wrongdoing and termination of employment on account of their "failure to cooperate" and/or "lack of candor";
7. the CIA, in violation of its own regulations, consistently refuses to follow and to provide employees access to the Agency's own internal regulations governing the polygraph;
8. the CIA consistently refuses employees like Ciralsky their right under Agency regulations to review, inter alia, their polygraph "results" and audio and video recordings of their polygraph sessions and reports and material derived from polygraph testing (thereby leaving an employee no way of verifying whether he or she "passed" or "passed inconclusively" or "failed" the polygraph;
9. employees are questioned and harassed during polygraph examinations about issues that are intrinsically tied, inter alia, to their religion or race or ethnic background in violation of Executive Order 12968, the First and Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Agency Regulations, and the American Polygraph Association's Code of Conduct (by which Agency polygraphers are supposed to abide); and
10. employees are routinely denied their right under Agency regulations to consult with a polygraph supervisor and/or their own management.
r. Direct the CIA to refer those names of its current or former employees who disclosed information pertaining to Ciralsky in violation of the Privacy Act to the DOJ for consideration of criminal prosecution under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i);
s. Direct the CIA to refer those names of its current or former employees who conducted unlawful electronic surveillance on Ciralsky in violation of FISA to the DOJ for consideration of criminal prosecution under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809 and/or 1827.
t. Direct the CIA to hold a fair hearing to provide Ciralsky an opportunity to clear his name;
u. Direct the CIA to convene an impartial review board to assess Ciralsky's fitness to hold a security clearance;
v. Award Ciralsky back pay in an amount equal to the salary withheld by the CIA after he was involuntarily placed in a leave without pay status beginning March 1, 1999 to the present, with interest thereon;
w. Award Ciralsky compensation pursuant to Title VII as amended in the amount of $300,000, plus interest thereon;
x. Award Ciralsky an appropriate amount of compensatory damages pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4);
y. Awarding Ciralsky actual damages under to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq., of not less than $1,000 or $100 per day for each day he was subjected to unlawful electronic surveillance, whichever is greater;
z. Awarding Ciralsky compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000, plus interest thereon, against the individually sued defendant jointly and severally;
aa. Awarding Ciralsky punitive damages in the amount of $100,000, plus interest thereon, against each individually sued defendant;
bb. Awarding Ciralsky all costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred in pursuing this action, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), 50 U.S.C. § 1810, and 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(E), 552a(g)(3)(B) and/or (g)(4)(B).
cc. Order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury on all issues of fact, including the amount of damages to be awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
David H. Shapiro
D.C. Bar No. 961326
Swick & Shapiro, P.C.
Suite 1290
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 842-0300
________________________
Edward Tolchin
D.C. Bar No. 297556
Fettmann, Tolchin & Majors
Suite 502
10615 Judicial Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
(703) 385-9500
________________________
Janine M. Brookner
D.C. Bar No. 467360
3645 St. Mary's Place
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 338-5743
Counsel for Plaintiff
I swear under penalty of perjury that the factual allegations contained in the foregoing Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, belief, information and recollection.
________________________
Date
________________________
Adam J. Ciralsky
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